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THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i. The proposed project, costing an estimated US$156 million equiv-
alent, consists of the last two years of the Korean National Railroad's
(KNR) US$310 million 1967-1971 Development Plan. The proposed loan of
US$40 million equivalent and IDA Credit of US$15 million equivalent would
finance about 70% of the foreign exchange costs of the project. This
would be the third Bank Group lending for KNR; the earlier years of the
KNR 1967-1971 Development Plan received the support of a 1967 IDA Credit
of US$11 million equivalent (Credit 110-KO). The first Bank Group lend-
ing for KNR was in 1962 (Credit 25-KO) and amounted to US$14 million
equivalent.
ii. The extremely rapid expansion of production in Korea in recent
years has placed severe pressure on the transport system. Following
the recommendations of a Bank financed transportation survey, Government
investment in transport has greatly increased, reaching in 1967 nearly
three times the level of 1965, and accounting for 28% of domestic fixed
capital formation, but it is clear that unless there is further substantial
investment in transport capacity, the present growth of the economy cannot
be maintained. KNR has been forced to increase significantly the magni-
tude of its original 1967-1971 investment plan which was appraised as
the basis for Credit 110-KO. Substantial expansion of investment is also
taking place in road transport which is seriously underdeveloped and needs
attention. In addition to the IDA credits for the railway mentioned above,
the Bank Group in 1968 made a credit of US$3.5 million (S4-KO) for highway
feasibility studies and engineering and for a study of transport organiza-
tion and coordination.
iii. In spite of the rapid growth in road transport, the economy con-
tinues to rely heavily on railway services, particularly for the transport
of production inputs such as fuels, minerals, building materials and fer-
tilizers, and for the increasing movement of grains that has accompanied
urbanization and industrialization. The KNR investment plans are primarily
designed to increase capacity to meet these rapidly growing traffic demands.
iv. The main items of the proposed project include motive power and
rolling stock (48%), increase in station and line capacity (30%) track
renewals (11%) and improvement of telecommunications (5%). The proposed
loan/credit would finance specific goods procured through international
competitive bidding: 50 diesel locomotives, 2,740 freight cars, telecommuni-
cations equipment, mechanized track maintenance equipment and consulting
services. The total foreign exchange component of the project amounts to
an estimated US$83.7 million equivalent. This is to be financed by the
proposed loan and credit totalling US$55 million, bilateral and other as-
sistance totalling US$18.7 million, with the remaining US$10.0 million
being purchased from Korea's foreign exchange (KFX) reserves by KNR from
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its Won cash resources. Should local Korean firms win contracts for con-
structing freight cars, disbursements from the proposed loan/credit would
be made against the total costs of such cars, including a local cost com-
ponent of about 50%. If Korean firms were to win contracts for all the
freight cars, about US$15 million of the US$30 million loan/credit funds
disbursed against these contracts would be available to cover, in effect,
the US$10 million foreign exchange gap referred to above, allowing a maxi-
mum net contribution from the loan/credit of up to US$5 million toward
the finance of the local currency costs of the project.
v. The proposed project is based on KNR proposals to expand the
1967-1971 investment plan beyond that appraised as a basis for Credit
110-KO. A number of changes have been made from KNR's proposals and
were agreed during negotiations.
vi. A major problem in Korea is that the investment criteria in
general use and the local expertise ia inivestment analysis are not ade-
quate relative to the size and urgency of investment needs. There exists
the clear danger of waste in the use of scarce resources due to inadequate
analysis of alternatives. The consultants' study financed under Credit
S4-KO of the organization, staffing needs and criteria of the decision-
making bodies in the transport field is nearing completion: during nego-
tiations it was agreed that by December 31, 1970, an appropriate plan
for reforms will be drawn up. The implementation of these reforms will
be an important complement to the project. Also included in the project
are a number of consultants' studies in important areas of railway opera-
tions to help determine the optimum pattern of railway investment.
vii. The management of KNR is generally sound, although the measure
of KNR autonomy from Government controls envisaged under Credit llO-KO
has not been fully achieved. During negotiations agreement was reached
on measures to effect some improvement in freedom on accounting and bud-
geting procedures. The efficiency of operations is high and has general-
ly improved in response to the increasing pressure of traffic demand.
Maintenance of property and equipment is satisfactory.
viii. The project as defined in this report has been found to be
technically and economically sound. The financial position of the rail-
road is sound (a rate of return of 4.4% was earned in 1968) and the out-
look is good - a return of over 7% is expected from 1971 onwards. The
economic rates of return on the items to be financed by the proposed
loan/credit average 20%.
ix. The proposed project provides a suitable basis for a Bank loan
of US$40 million equivalent for a term of 25 years, including a four-year
period of grace, and an IDA Credit of US$15 million equivalent, to the
Republic of Korea. The loan and credit would be passed on to KNR as
beneficiary on terms identical to those of the loan.
KOREA
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Korean National
Railroad (KNR) have asked the Bank for a loan of US$40 million equivalent,
and the Association for a credit of US$15 million equivalent, to finance
part of the foreign exchange cost of KNR's investments during the last
two years of the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan of Korea, 1967-
1971. KNR's investments during these two years are estimated at Won 47.5
billion (US$156 million equivalent) with a foreign exchange component of
US$83.7 million equivalent. As in previous Bank Group lending operations
for KNR, the proposed loan/credit would finance specific imported goods;
other foreign requirements would be covered by various bilateral arrange-
ments and from the Government's own foreign exchange resources which would
be bought by KNR from its Won balances.
1.02 The Bank Group has helped finance two previous railway projects
in Korea. Both were IDA Credits, 25-KO for US$14.0 million equivalent in
1962 and 110-KO for US$11 million equivalent in 1967. Performance on both
of these projects has generally been satisfactory. Rolling stock procured
under the last credit is already in service and consultants - Touche, Ross
& Co. (Canada) - required to examine and advise on certain aspects of
working, are now in the field. The only other Bank Group lending for
transportation in Korea has been a technical assistance credit, S4-KO,
for US$3.5 million equivalent made in 1968 for highway feasibility studies
and detailed engineering, transport coordination and a highway organization
study.
1.03 This appraisal is based on information supplied by the Government
of Korea and the Korean National Railroad and on the findings of a Bank
mission in May 1969, comprising Messrs. Chapman (financial analyst),
Blumstein (railway engineer), Bronfman (economist) and Dickenson (tele-
communication engineer). This report was prepared by them and edited by
Miss V. Foster.
2. BACKGROUND
A. Economic Settin
2.01 Economic growth has been impressive in Korea during recent years.
The growth rate of real GNP increased from an annual average of 7% during
1962-1964 to 10.4% during 1965-1966; and, in spite of droughts in the last
two years, real GNP grew by 9% in 1967 and 13% in 1968, largely because of
the very high growth rate of the industrial sector. According to the
findings of the most recent Bank Economic Mission, GNP grew by 15.5% in
1969 and is expected to grow by 10% annually in the following three years;
a long-term average annual growth level of 9% is forecast.
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2.02 The population in mid-1968 was approximately 30.5 million, rep-
resenting a density of 300 per km2, higher than that of Japan (270) but
less than that of Taiwan (360). Per capita GNP increased appreciably from
$118 in 1962 to about $190 in 1969. This level, however, is still below
that of almost three-fifths of the developing countries. In the last
decade, with the vigorous implementation of family plaining, the rate of
population growth has slowed from 3.0% to 2.2% and it is expected that
the short-term target of 22 population growth of 1971 will be reached.
There has been a distinct trend toward urbanization as well as industrial-
ization. During 1960-1966, the urban population grew at 6% annually, as
opposed to a rural growth rate of only 1.3%. Approximately 15% of the
country's population is concentrated in the capital city of Seoul and its
immediate surroundings.
2.03 The bulk of investment in recent years has been in the manufactur-
ing sector and associated infrastructure; generally there has been an em-
phasis on production for export. Merchandise exports increased from a
level of less than $90 million in 1962-1964 to almost $670 million in 1969.
Two-thirds of exports by value are now contributed by uianufactured products;
manufacturing and mining outputs increased by 26% in 1968 and now account
for a quarter of GNP. With respect to producer goods, production of fuels,
cement, electrical machinery and appliances, electronics, chemicals and
petrochemicals show the fastest growth.
2.04 Agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted for 29% of GNP in
1968. Agricultural development has gradually been gaining momentum and,
beginning in 1969, the Government is increasing considerably its invest-
ment allocation to that sector and is promoting fertilizer inputs. Rice
and barley are the most important agricultural products and constitute the
staple d'':t of the population. Livestock production and the production of
cereals for market have increased considerably as a result of rising urban
demand and Government promotion.
B. The Transport Sector
2.05 The extremely rapid expansion in production has placed severe
pressures on the transport system. Additional facilities are particularly
needed to carry the heavy inputs for production such as coal, petroleum
products, fertilizer and cement and to move grain from its source in rural
areas to the cities. In recent years the output of the transportation
sector has been growing at a faster pace than GNP and has required substan-
tial investment in transport. Annual public investments in transportation
increased threefold during the period 1965-1967, reaching 28% of total
domestic fixed capital formation. Nevertheless, Korea's transportation
sector contributes only 4% to GNP and continues to be a bottleneck to
economic development. Table 1 shows the movement of freight and passengers
over all transportation modes in Korea since 1958; it indicates an increase
of 14% p.a. in freight handling and of 15Z p.a. in passenger traffic betwee,1
1958 and 1967. In spite of a rapid growth in traffic by road, the railroad
continues to be the predominant mode, with 77% of ton-km and 44% of pass-km.
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2.06 In 1966, the country had 34,500 km of roads of which only 1,930
km or 5.6% were paved. In line with the recommendations of a Bank-financed
Transportation Survey 1/, the Government in 1968 greatly increased the al-
locations for highway construction (from W 2.1 billion in 1967 to W 15.6
billion in 1968 and W 21.6 billion in 1969). However most of these funds
were allocated to the construction of the Seoul-In Cheon and Seoul-Pu San
four-lane toll expressways which may be economically premature. Under an
IDA Technical Assistance Credit (S4-KO of July 1968 for US$3.5 million),
feasibility studies are being carried out by consultants 2/ for high
prioritv roads totalling about 800 km, out of which about 400 km are to be
selected for detailed engineering. The motor vehicle fleet increased from
38,000 in 1964 to over 74,000 in 1968, an annual increase rate of 18% (Table
2). During 1963-1967, road motor vehicle traffic increased annually by 16%
for passengers and 11% for freight. Despite this growth, the present vehicle
fleet is equivalent to an average of only one vehicle for 430 persons as
compared with one for 190 in Thailand and one for 120 in the Philippines.
The supply of road transport vehicles in the past has been curtailed by
import restrictions designed to conserve foreign exchange. These restric-
tions are now being relaxed and local assembly plants are beginning to
supply the domestic market. The shortage of trucks, which are mainly
engaged in short-haul traffic, contributes at least as much to the develop-
ing transportation bottlenecks as the lack of roads.
2.07 With foreign and domestic trade increasing rapidly, there has
been a growing demand for ocean and coastal shipping. Tonnage handled by
ports has increased considerably, mainly because of grain imports. Coastal
shipping traffic trebled since 1965 because of diversion (at high cost)
of fuel and cement from the overburdened railroad system.
2.08 Air traffic remains comparatively small and is carried by the
privately-owned Korean Air Lines (KAL) which provides limited domestic
and international flights.
C. Transport Coordination
2.09 The growth of transport requirements and the present evolution
from a virtual single mode (railroad) to a multimode transport system make
transport planning and coordination an increasingly important issue. Under
IDA Technical Assistance Credit S4-KO, consultants 3/ have examined the
present Government organization and agencies dealing with transport in-
frastructure and reviewed the pricing and regulation practices with regard
1/ Korea Transportation Survey - December 1966 by consultants BCEOM
(France) NEDECO NEI (Netherlands) and SOFRERAIL (France).
2/ INGEROUTE (France) and the joint venture Amman and Whitney Interna-
tional Ltd. and Trans/Asia Engineering Associates Inc. (USA).
3/ BCEOM (France) and NEDECO (Netherlands).
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to transport services. The consultants' Draft Final Report is currently
being reviewed by the Government and the Bank. A Final Report is expected
by April 1970. Three matters in the Report are directly or indirectly
related to KNR and the proposed project:
Government policy toward transport investment;
KNR's pricing policy; and
Government restrictions on rail traffic.
(i) Government Policy toward Transport Investments
2.10 The Korean Government has initiated a short-term nolicy aimed
at a rapid expansion of highway capacity without sufficient regard to
long-term objectives. Also, in some cases substantial investments have
been decided before alternative solutions had been thoroughly explored.
This situation is to some extent due to the lack of coordination between
the various Government departments and agencies dealing with transportation.
A summary of the distribution of responsibility is given in Annex 1. The
consultants in their draft report recommend control of rates and fares as
a basic coordination instrument. This is at variance with the idea, pro-
pounded by them and supported by the Association, that supply and demand
for transport services should meet, as freely as possible, in open and fair
competition. Also, while agreeing that concentration of all main transport
activities under one ministry should be the objective (which is also in
line with the conclusions of the 1966 Transportation Survey of Korea), their
recommendation is to add three more bodies, a Transport Coordination Ministers
Conference (TCMC), a Transport Coordination Office (TCO), and a Trans-
port Coordination Working Group, to the already crowded chart of the Govern-
ment. The Association has expressed its reservations concerning these rec-
ommendations to the Government. However, early in 1970 and without pre-
vious consultation, the Government appointed the TCMC and created and
staffed the TCO. The latter has been placed under the MOT which has only
partial authority over transport planning 1/. These arrangements are un-
satisfactory. The consultants are now preparing a final report in the
light of comments received. During negotiations it was agreed that after
receiving the consultant's Final Report, the Government and the Bank will
discuss and agree by no later than December 31, 1970 on the measures, and
a time phased program for their implementation, necessary to achieve ade-
quate transport coordination, particularly with respect to establishing
an effective body for over-all planning of the transport sector.
(ii) KNR's Pricing Policy
2.11 Although freight rates are held at a low level as a matter of
Government policy, freight revenues presently cover variable costs and
make a sizeable contribution to covering overheads. Passenger fares
have been raised to a relatively higher level, and passenger revenues not
only cover fully distributed costs, but also enable KNR to provide funds
1/ MOC retains authority over planning for Highways and Ports.
for investment. In view of the rapid growth of road transport, KNR's
dependence upon passenger services to meet desirable revenue targets may
prove increasingly infeasible. The railways must give early consideration
to pricing policies that will maintain financial viability in the coming
competitive environment. Proposals to adjust the situation are discussed
in paragraph 6.05.
(iii) Government Restrictions on Rail Traffic
2.12 To reduce the heavy demand on railroad services the Government
recently decided to prohibit freight traffic (except coal) by rail over
distances of less than 50 km (100 km for fertilizers). At these short
distances it is doubtful that present railway rates cover the economic
costs involved. W4hen freight rates are revised on the basis of costs,
the need for these restrictions should disappear. Agreement has been
reached during negotiations that Government will lift these restrictions
when, as agreed under Credit llO-KO, freight rates are revised.
3. THE KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
A. Organization and Management
3.01 Until 1963, KNR was an integral part of the Ministry of Trans-
portation; it had no separate legal status or independent management. A
requirement under Credit 25-KO in 1962 was that the Government should
establish and maintain the Railroad as a separate entity with an appro-
priate organization and powers. In 1963, under the Government Organization
Law, KNR was established with an independent manager and its own budget and
accounting. The revised organization of the Railroad was an improvement,
but there was still an excessive degree of dependence on and control by
Government in financial, budgeting and staff matters. Under Credit 110-KO
in 1967 the Government undertook to find suitable organizational solutions.
Specifically there is need for more autonomy in financial matters, while
on the staff side, KNR is still part of Government with senior appointments
being controlled by the President of the Republic and with scales of remu-
neration tied to Government, not generally competitive with industry.
During negotiations, agreement was reached on measures to increase KNR's
autonomy in financial matters (para. 6.25). On the staff side, KNR and
Government maintained that no major problems exist and that considerable
constitutional difficulties would be encountered in transferring KNR's
staff from the present Government civil service rules and regulations to
the direct control of KNR. It was agreed that the present and foreseeable
situation does not warrant making changes which would involve such dif-
ficulties for the Government and KNR.
3.02 Management suffers from a shortage of senior qualified engineer-
ing, economic and accounting staff. This fact, together with the size and
complexity of KNR's development program, led to a requirement under Credit
110-KO that KNR engage consultants to study (i) the whole complex problem
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of the reception, storage, manufacture (into briquets) and distribution of
coal in the Seoul area; and (ii) statistics, traffic costing, freight car
design and maintenance, marshalling yards and uneconomic lines. Study (i)
has been satisfactorily completed by SOFRERAIL (France), see paragraph
3.35. There was some delay in agreeing to the terms of reference for the
other studies but a contract was finalized in August 1969 with Touche, Ross
& Co. (Canada), assisted by staff of Canadian National Railways. In addi-
tion it was agreed during the negotiations for the proposed loan/credit
that KNR would prepare a staff training program.
B. Staff
3.03 The employment of qualified management staff has been adversely
affected by the substantially higher salaries paid by private enterprise.
The wage level of lower grade staff is also low. To correct this, KNR
embarked, at Government direction and in common with other Government
enterprises, on a policy of improving all wages and salaries by granting
annual increases of 30% (about 20% in real terms) during the 1966-1968
period. The gap between KNR and private sector remunerations is to
be narrowed still further by the continuation of this policv in the years
1969-1971. Even with the doubling of wages and salaries between 1965 and
1968, total staff costs in 1968 were only 34% of operating expenses, which
is low in relation to other railways.
3.04 The number of permanent employees at the end of 1968 was 35,192,
an increase of 8,900 or 34% since 1961. In the same period, traffic units
(ton-km + pass-km) increased by 129% and productivity per employee rose by
66% from 298,000 to 496,000 traffic units, which is good compared with
most other railways (for instance, Chile 184,000: South Africa 275,000:
Japan 519,000). There is scope for further improvement of KNR through
modernization and increasing mechanization, both of which are in progress
and should be aided by future implementation of the consultants' recommenda-
tions and by the investments under the proposed loan/credit.
3.05 As a result of transfer to permanent status, the number of
temporary employees decreased from 5,400 in 1966 to 3,800 in 1968. Of
these some 3,300 are used in the workshops, largely for the construction
of new passenger and freight cars and the rebuilding of old cars.
3.06 In general, relations with labor are satisfactory and staff dis-
plays excellent discipline and industriousness.
C. Railroad Property
(i) Railway Lines
3.07 At the end of 1968, KNR operated 3,108 route-km of standard
gauge (1.435 m) and 126 km of narrow gauge (0.915 m) lines (Map). The
condition of track is satisfactory but, although 30% of the track length
is laid in 50-kg/m rails, with the growth of traffic and use of heavier
diesel locomotives, further 50-kg/m rail relaying is necessary and plannee.
KNR proposed relaying 1,475 km during the plan period, but in the Bank's
opinion a program of about 1,000 km would be more appropriate to KNR's
requirements and capacity. Centralized traffic control (CTC) was installed
in October 1968 on the single track line of heaviest traffic running east
from Seoul; increasing traffic on this line is still creating capacity
problems which are the subject of later comments (paras. 3.11-3.14). KNR
also plans further installation of CTC in the Seoul area, to be financed
from German bilateral aid. Line capacity is being expanded by extending
crossing loops and handling facilities at major stations.
(ii) Motive Power and Rolling Stock
3.08 KNR's motive power and rolling stock position at the end of 1968
is given in Table 3. The fleet consisted of 367 locomotives (115 steam,
252 diesel); 161 diesel rail cars; 1,336 passenger coaches and 13,239
freight cars.
3.09 The 115 steam locomotives (of which 75 are in active duty) are
to be retained until they can be replaced by modern power, the final phase-
out taking place in 1973. In April/May 1969, KNR received 30 additional
diesel locomotives (10 main line and 20 shunters) financed by the Export-
Import Bank (USA).
3.10 Consultants will be appointed to study the problem of diesel loco-
motive and rail car maintenance (in conjunction with the related work-
shop problem discussed later in paragraph 3.20). During negotiations
agreement was reached on the terms of reference of such a study (Annex 2)
and because of its urgency, finalization of the consultants' contract is
made a condition of effectiveness of the proposed loan/credit.
3.11 Development of the fast growing cement industry in the north-
eastern part of Korea, where the major anthracite coal mines are also
located, creates heavy traffic between this area and Seoul. Situated in
mountainous country with no highway connections at present, this area is
linked to Seoul by some 350 km of single track railway lines. In 1968,
these lines carried 11.5 million tons or 40Z of KKR's freight traffic,
and by 1981 this tonnage is expected to double. To meet such an increase
in traffic will require (a) double tracking or (b) improved operations
giving substantial increased line capacity.
3.12 Double tracking, because of the difficulty of the terrain, would
be very expensive (present estimates are about US$90 million) and would
take a long time to complete. The possibility of improved operations
has been examined (Annex 3) and the most practical and economic solution
is considered to be electrification of the existing single lines.
3.13 The entire electrification project, including ground facilities,
motive power, modification of signals, communications, and the construction
of a 13-km link line between Go Han and Hwang Ji stations (shortening the
hauling distance between East-West by about 50 km) is estimated to cost
about US$63 million equivalent. The work will require about three years
for completion as against KNR's original estimate of two years. KNR has
negotiated a contract of about US$57 million equivalent with a consortium
of European manufacturers (Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland) for the
financing and execution of the electrification scheme (excluding construct-
ion of the 13-km link being financed by KNR). The cost estimates are rea-
sonable, and the terms and conditions obtained are satisfactory. The con-
tract is awaiting ratification by the Governments involved.
3.14 On the basis of 1973 traffic, electrification, as compared with
theoretical diesel traction, will resuLt in a yearly operating saving of
about US$1 million equivalent. According to present traffic forecasts,
electrification would fully meet traffic demands for at least the next 15
years.
3.15 About 800 of the 1,336 passenger coaches are under 10 years old.
These, t-gether with about 41 modern coaches acquired in 1968, KNR's
annual production of about 100 new cars and the rebuilding of old cars in
its workshops, should cover requirements over the plan period.
3.16 The average capacity of freight cars is about 35 tons and is
expected to increase as more new higher capacity units, 50-ton (or higher)
cars, are placed in service. Some 30% of all freight cars are over 25 years
old and have been used extensively. Productivity is satisfactory, but the
physical shortage of freight cars is at present one of the main bottlenecks
in Korean transportation. As eiscuseed in Annex 4 (Item IV), to carry the
forecast traffic would require f.he acquisition of 4,250 new cars during
1969-1971. KNR's proposals were for about 2,250 cars and, as agreed during
negotiations, provision for an additional 2,000 cars has been included in
the revised plan.
(iii) Telecommunications
3.17 Much of KNR's existing telecommunications network has reached
the end of its expected life and is in extremely poor condition; opera-
tions are being hampered by failures and breakdowns. A program was sub-
mitted by KNR for modernization and development of the communications
network. Except for some items of low priority which have been deleted
at the Bank's suggestion, it forms a provisional basis for Bank financing.
This program which, together with its engineering and traffic justifica-
tions, is set out in Annex 5, would take care of the priority requirements.
In order to finalize the proposi ls, carry out the detailed engineering
design and also rationalize plans for expansion of KNR's telecommunications
network, it was agreed during negotiations that KNR would obtain expert ad-
vice through the employment of consultants whose terms of reference (Annex 6)
were agreed upon.
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(iv) Marshalling Yards, Workshops and Other Property
3.18 Marshalling yard facilities, now under study by the Canadian
consultants, are generally inadequate in relation to rapidly expanding
traffic and the need to increase consolidated train load operations.
Major enlargements of general purpose yards are planned at Je Cheon, Pu
San, and in the Seoul area. Whether these investments are appropriate-
ly responsive to the needs of the system has yet to be established.
Agreement was reached during negotiations that implementation of KNR's
plans would not commence until the consultants' studies of yards, now
under way, have been completed in about mid-1970, and their recommenda-
tions agreed with the Association.
3.19 KNR presently has four main workshops: Yeon Deung Po (Seoul)
for steam traction: Yong San (Seoul) for diesel rail cars, passenger and
freight car maintenance; In Cheon, for constructing and rebuilding
passenger coaches and freight cars; and Pu San, for heavy maintenance of
diesel locomotives and repairs of freight cars. Replacement of workshop
plant and equipment is necessary and planned. Yeong Deung Po workshop
will be closed when steam traction is phased out by about 1973; the area
is then planned for freight handling facilities. Electric locomotives,
to be delivered in 1973 and after, will be maintained at Je Cheon, which
is the best location and where existing facilities can be adapted for
this purpose.
3.20 KNR also proposes to build a new workshop at Dae Jeon. The
Korean Transport Survey of 1966 questioned the justification of this
investment and the Bank shared these doubts. It was agreed during nego-
tiations that (a) consultants would review the present position (draft
terms of reference in Annex 2), and (b) construction of the Dae Jeon
workshop would be postponed until the consultants' recommendations are
available and have been commented upon by the Government, KNR and the
Bank. Because of the urgency of the proposed study, finalization of
the consultants' contract is made a condition of effectiveness of the
proposed loan/credit.
3.21 KNR's plans for Dae Jeon workshop included the manufacture of
motive power and rolling stock. While KNR is capable of repairing
motive power and rolling stock and of semi-manufacturing the latter, it
is doubtful that it can economically undertake full manufacture of motive
power and rolling stock. This is particularly so for motive power, which
requires highly specialized technology. The market is also comparatively
small and highly competitive. It was agreed during negotiations that KNR
would not be caused, or permitted, to engage in the manufacture of motive
power.
3.22 Many of KNR's buildings (offices, stations, sheds) are old and
too small for growing traffic requirements. At 37 stations, the buildings
will be improved for passenger use. Much needed new railway headquarters
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will be erected in front of the Seoul passenger station with underground
access to the station; this will take the form of a 21-story building,
17 floors of which will be rented.
D. Traffic and Operations
(i) Freight Traffic
3.23 Freight traffic statistics for the period 1964 to 1968 are shown
in Table 4. In this period, the yearly growth was about 9% in tonnage
and 11% in ton-km. This was almost entirely due to commercial traffic 1/
which grew 10% in tonnage and 12% in ton-km. Commercial freight now
accounts for 89% of all ton-km, as against 51% in 1955. The principal
commodity carried is coal, which increased from 8.2 million tons in 1964
to a peak of 11.0 million tons in 1967 and declined to 9.6 million tons
in 1968 "L.ecause of mild weather in the 1967/68 winter and incr-easing
substitution for coal in house'-<d consumption). Cement traffic has in-
creased at a rate in excess of 25% annually, to reach 3.1 million tons
in 1968. High increases were registered in the haul of iron ote, oil,
fertilizer and grains. In 1968 the composition of bulk goods in KNR's
commercial traffic was as follows:
% of tonnage % ton-km
Coal 3L. 34%
Cement 13% 14%
Oil, grain, fertilizer,
ore and timber 28% 29%
72% 77%
3.24 In 1969 the average length of haul of commercial traf fic was 240
km and has increased -by 2.6% during the last five years. This is largely
a result of a process of import substitution: goods previously hauled from
the ports to the consumption area (i.e., In Cheon-Seoul) are now being
hauled from more distant plants in Korea (i.e., Ulsan-Seoul). The growth
in net ton-km in 1967 and 1968 was 13.4% and 11.1X, respectively, which
is in line with the average rate of 11% per annum used for the appraisal
of the second railway project for the 1967-1971 period. HIowever, in 1968,
the actual traffic figure was 4% below the forecast, reflecting the in-
adequacy of KNR transportation capacity to meet the demand.
'.25 In 1972 freight traffic is expected to reach a total of 43.7
million tons and 11.4 billion ton-km, an average yearly increase of
11% in tonnage and 13% in ton-km. The average length of haul should in-
crease from 244 km in 1970 to 268 km in 1972, mainly because of a continua-
tion of the process of import substitution. The largest volume of railway
1/ as distinct from military and railway service freight.
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traffic is coal which, in 1972, should reach a volume of 12.2 million tons
and would account for 36% of the total. Production and haulage of coal are
expected to level off at the 1972 figures. Despite the process of sub-
stitution by some coal users in urban houses and industry, a reverse proc-
ess is taking place at farmers' homes to replace firewood by coal. This
is strongly supported by the Government to prevent deforestation. Coal
use is also encouraged because of the shortage of foreign exchange to
pay for oil imports. Cement transport is expected to have a dramatic in-
crease during the period from 4.4 million tons in 1969 to 9.1 million tons
in 1972, accounting that year for 21% of total freight traffic. The ce-
ment industry located in the northeastern region is expanding its capacity
to cope with the increasing demand of the building and highway construction
industries. Haulage of petroleum products will increase as two new refineries
begin operations during the period. Grain traffic will increase as local
production substitutes for imports.
(ii) Passenger Traffic
3.26 Table 5 shows that during the 1964-1968 period, the annual increase
in passengers was 5% and in pass-km 8%, with the average distance per jour-
ney increasing from 62 to 70 km. A 35% fare increase in January 1965 pro-
duced a decline of 6% of total pass-km in that year. In 1966 and 1967
traffic in pass-km increased rapidly by 25% and 10%, respectively. Fares
were again increased by 50% late in 1967 and in 1968 the number of passengers
remained at the 1967 level; however, total pass-km rose by 10% because of the
increased average distance of journey, and was somewhat higher than the fore-
cast used for the appraisal of Credit 110-KO.
3.27 Commuter traffic is concentrated on the Seoul-In Cheon line.
In 1968, commuter traffic represented 26% of the total passengers carried
and 8% of the pass-km, long distance traffic 73% and 88%, respectively,
and military personnel the balance of 1% and 4%, respectively.
3.28 Passenger traffic forecasts are given in Table 5 and are expected
to reach, in 1972, a total of 206 million passengers and 14.4 billion pass-
km, with a growth rate of 8% per annum. Commuter traffic is expected to
grow at 7% per annum and long distance traffic at 8.5% per annum. This
growth appears reasonable until the end of the period, given the expected
growth of income and population, and the inadequacy of the highway network.
3.29 In the long run KNR, especially in the field of passenger
services, can expect to meet increasing competition from road transport
as the new expressways and improved roads are completed. However, pro-
vided KNR can offer efficient service, it should be able to maintain its
position in freight traffic since over 75% of the freight carried consists
of bulky low value commodities which are not suited to road transport.
(iii) Operations
3.30 Table 6 gives a summary of operating statistics from 1963 to
1968. It shows that operating efficiency is satisfactory: traffic units
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per locomotive have risen by 47% during this period, traffic units per
employee by 19%, and pass-km per passenger car have improved by 10%.
Steam traction is mostly confined to shunting services and only about 1%
of the train-km are steam operated (against 36% in 1963); steam has, how-
ever, to be retained until completion of the electrification program on
selected lines (i.e. about 1973); the release of diesel locomotives coming
from these electrified lines will enable the phaseout of steam traction to
be completed.
3.31 Availability of diesel locomotives has been maintained at about
95%, but is likely to fall below 90% when KNR begins to carry out regular
maintenance required by the aging of the fleet; the daily output of 411 km
per engine available is satisfactory. Availability of diesel rail cars
is only 82X and the dailv performance, 342 km, shows a decrease of 11%
since 1966; this kind of equipment is not suited to the rugged Korean
conditions and KNR does not plan further accuisition of rail cars.
3.32 The average daily run per passenger coach available is 280 km,
which is satisfactory, but the availability of passenger stock, 87% in
1968, should be improved. Passenger cars have an average occupancy of
75%, which is high.
3.33 Freight cars carry close to their effective capacity, 32 tons,
against an average capacity of 35 tons. Productivity of freight cars
in 1968, at 519,000 ton-km per car in fleet, has increased by 25% since
1963 and is very high compared to that of other railways (Germany: 164,000;
France: 210,000; Argentina: 265,000; Japan: 408,000). From a statistical
point of view this is an excellent performance but it is also a sign that
demand exceeds supply and that customer service is therefore likely to be
poor.
3.34 These figures of use and performance indicate that increases in
traffic must entail further investment to expand capacity. However, there
is scope for better utilization of some existing assets. For example, with
the orovision of more adequate storage, the turn-around time of oil tank
cars has recently been improved from 6.5 to 3.4 days. Improved maintenance
of rolling stock, installation of adequate loading and unloading facilities,
and proDer handling of coal traffic, together with improved telecommuni-
cations, should allow for a progressive reduction in car turn-around time
which now averages 4.6 days.
'.35 The coal problem, which is reviewed in Annex 7, has been studied
by consultants appointed under Credit 110-KO but no action has been taken
on their recommendations. Since coal traffic and distribution is the
responsibility of a number of parties (KNR, coal interests, briquet manu-
facturers, City of Seoul, Government Agencies), coordinated action led by
the Government is necessary, and a coordinating body should be established
for this purpose. It was agreed during negotiations that (a) before the
end of June 1970, the Government will prepare a program, satisfactory to
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the Bank, for the implementation of the consultant's recommendations;
(b) the Economic Planning Board (EPB) will be the responsible agency for
the coordination of the implementation program; and (c) the recommenda-
tions will be executed and implemented by December 31, 1972.
4. THE PLAN AND THE PROJECT
A. The Plan
4.01 KNR's original Second Five-Year Plan 1967-1971, as agreed and
appraised under Credit 110-KO, amounted to W 57.4 billion (US$217 million
equivalent). The additional works carried over from the 1962-1966 pro-
gram brought total investment over the plan period to an estimated W 63.6
billion (US$240 million equivalent) with a foreign exchange component of
US$91 million equivalent.
4.02 In 1968, the Government revised its Second Five-Year Development
Plan, 1967-1971, and to meet the needs brought about by the rapid pace of
development, KNR also revised its plan of investment for this period.
The revised plan has been appraised by the Bank and, with certain revi-
sions as a restult of this appraisal, is now estimated to involve expen-
diture of about W 89 billion (about US$308 million equivalent), with an
estimated foreign exchange component of US$147 million (Tables 7 and 8).
4.03 The main amendments to the original 1967-1971 Plan (Annex 4)
and the scope of the revised 1967-1971 Plan, a summary of which is given
below (see Annex 4 for a description of the main items), were agreed during
negotiations. Assurances were also obtained that KNR would not undertake
major investments outside the agreed plan without the prior approval of
the Bank.
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1967-1971 Investment Plan Summary (Revised)
W billion US$ million % of Total
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Expenditure
1. Construction of New
Lines 7.1 0.1 7.2 26.0 0.6 26.6 9
2. Increase in Station
and Line Capacity 18.9 4.1 23.0 65.4 13.6 79.0 26
3. Way and Structure Re-
newals and Improve-
ments 4.8 4.1 8.9 16.9 13.6 30.5 10
4. Motive Power and
Rolling Stock 10.1 31.4 40.2 30.5 109.9 140.4 46
5. Rolling Stock Equip-
ment and Construc-
tion 1.6 0.5 2.1 5.4 1.8 7.2 2
6. Miscellaneous 2.0 1.2 3.2 6.7 4.0 10.7 3
7. Total 43.2 41.4 84.6 151.0 143.4 294.4 96
8. Contingencies 3.0 1.1 4.1 10.0 3.3 13.3 4
9. Grand Total 46.2 42.5 88.7 161.0 146.7 307.7 100
B. The Project
4.04 The Project consists of the last two years of KNR's revised Develop-
ment Plan 1967-1971. The goods and equipment will be contracted during the
period, but some payments will carry over to 1972 (para. 4.12). The total
cost of the Project is estimated at W 47.5 billion (US$155.8 million equiv-
alent) with a foreign exchange component of about US$83.7 million, of which
US$55 million would be provided by the proposed loan/credit. A breakdown
of the Project is given below with brief details:
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W billion US$ million % of Total
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Expenditure
1. Construction of
New Lines 1.3 - 1.3 4.1 - 4.1 3
2. Increase in Station
and Line Capacity 9.8 3.5 13.3 32.1 11.3 43.4 28
3. Way and Structure
Renewals and Im-
provements 2.0 2.9 4.9 6.5 9.7 16.2 10
4. Motive Power and
Rolling Stock 3.9 17.1 21.0 12.9 55.9 68.8 44
5. Rolling Stock Equip-
ment and Construc-
tion 0.5 - 0.5 1.8 - 1.8 1
6. Miscellaneous 1.5 1.0 2.5 4.7 3.5 8.2 5
7. Contingencies 3.0 1.0 4.0 10.0 3.3 13.3 9
22.0 25.5 47.5 72.1 83.7 155.8 100
4.05 "Motive Power and Rolling Stock" covers 50 diesel locomotives, 240
passenger cars (locally built), 48 heater cars, 3,740 freight cars includ-
ing specialized cars (2,740 to be procured, 1,000 to be built by KNR) and
1,680 containers. The diesel locomotives are required to help phase out
steam traction and to move the expected traffic. The passenger cars will
be needed to carry the expected growing traffic, while the heater cars are
required for passenger trains hauled by diesel locomotives. The freight
cars and the specialized cars will give much needed additional capacity
and should improve operating efficiency. During negotiations it was agreed
that KNR would engage consultants to assist in evaluating the bids for diesel
locomotives and for track maintenance equipment.
4.06 "Increase in Station and Line Capacity," which comprises the
commencement of ground facilities for electrification of 350 km of single
track line, signalling and track extensions including installation of CTC
in the Seoul area, improvements to marshalling yards and freight handling
facilities, is required to increase KNR's ability to meet the forecast
traffic demand.
4.07 "Way and Structure Renewals and Improvements" covers track renewals
and replacement of 37 kg/m rail with 50 kg/n rail, and procurement of
mechanized track maintenance equipment. Track renewals and the re-laying
of heavier rail, apart from the need for track replacement on a regular
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cycle, enable the railway to employ higher axle loads and to carry greater
densities of traffic at higher speeds. Mechanical track maintenance equip-
ment will improve the quality of work.
4.08 "Miscellaneous" consists largely of improvements to telecommunica-
tions necessitated by the age and poor condition of the equipment, as ex-
plained in Annex 5 and paragraph 3.17.
4.09 "Contingencies:" KNR's cost estimates are based on 1969 prices,
but with annual increases in wage rates and other local costs an allowance
of about 15% has been made for price contingencies on local expenditure; in
addition, with wages and other costs rising in the industrialized countries,
together with some uncertainty regarding the foreign exchange costs of
certain ilems, an allowance of abot,t 7-1/2% has been made for contingencies
on foreign costs of items other than those to be financed by the proposed
locnicreeit. In this case, the cost margins are considered more ample, and
a contingency allowance of about 3% is sufficient.
C. Financing of the Project
4.10 The resources available to finance the Project coming from KNR's
generation of funds and from local and foreign financing secured or prom-
ised are detailed in paragraphs 6.19 and 6.20 and in Table 9.
4.11 The Project items to be financed bv the proposed Bank loan and IDA
credit are listed in paragraph 4.12 and described in Annex 8.
D. Execution of the Project, Disbursement and Procurement
4.12 KNR is competent, with the help of consultants, to carry out the
Project. Cost estimates, based on 1969 figures, but with the addition of a
contingency allowance as explained in paragraph 4.09, are reasonable. Dis-
bursement will be made on the basis of c.i.f. costs of imported equipment,
or ex-factory price of goods procured in Korea, and of the foreign cost of
consulting services and training. Because of inevitable delays in prepara-
tion of designs for telecommunication equipment and in delivery of diesel
locomotives, disbursements will spread over into 1972 as shown below:
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Annual Expenditure
Total 1970 1971 1972
(US$ million)
50 diesel locomotives
and spares 19.5 2.0 7.5 10.0
2,740 freight cars 28.4 2.0 14.5 11.9
Track maintenance
equipment 2.4 .2 1.6 .6
Telecommunication
equipment 2.6 - .3 2.3
Consultants and Training .5 .4 .1
53.4 4.6 24.0 24.8
Contingencies (3%) 1.6 .1 .7 .8
55.0 4.7 24.7 25.6
In billion Won equivalent 16.76 1.43 7.53 7.8
% 100 8 45 47
4.13 The proposed loan/credit of US$55 million equivalent would be
35% of the total cost of the Project which is estimated at about US$156
million equivalent. All items to be financed by the loan/credit will be
procured through international competitive bidding in accordance with the
procedures of the Bank. It is expected that local Korean firms will par-
ticipate in bidding for the construction of the 2,740 freight cars. If
they are successful it would imply some local expenditure financing from
the proposed loan/credit; details on this are given in paragraph 6.22.
For the purposes of bid evaluation local bidders would be accorded a
nominal preference margin of 15% or the level of customs duties applicable
to such goods when imported, whichever is lower. Withdrawals from the loan
would be made after the whole of the credit has been withdrawn or committed.
If any savings in foreign expenditure result from favorable prices in com-
petitive bidding the corresponding savings in the loan account would be
used to finance the foreign exchange cost of additional but similar proj-
ect items subject to review and agreement with the Bank.
5. ECONOMIC EVALUATION
A. Introduction
5.01 Investments contained in KNR's Development Plan, 1967-1971, are
primarily designed to increase capacity to meet rapidly growing traffic
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demands. Since most of KNR's traffic consists of commodities such as
coal, ore, oil, fertilizer and cement, which are clearly rail-oriented
and suited to the use of large freight cars and, often, consolidated
trainloads, there is considerable scope for the purchase of more power-
ful locomotives, larger cars and heavier track. Such investments would
help to modernize equipment and reduce operating costs.
5.02 The Investment Plan as presently amended is designed to meet
traffic demand in 1970-1971 which is expected to be, in 1971, about
10 greater than that forecast for Credit 110-KO. Investment during the
period in such items as electrification, rail renewal, signalling and
telecommunications would also help KNR to cope with expected growing
traffic after 1971. At present, a shortage of transport capacity is
forcing industrial plants in the northeast and Ulsan areas to increase
inventories and reduce production while the demand of consumers and other
industries remains unsatisfied. For the movement of coal, cement, grains,
oil, iron ore and many other commodities, the railway is the most economic
carrier in Korea and provides the only network connecting all parts of
the country with the large commercial and industrial centers of Seoul
and Pu San as well as with the ports handling foreign trade.
5.03 If the total railway investment plan were not carried out, large
tonnages of coal, cement, iron ore, oil products, grain and fertilizer
would have to be diverted at very high cost to coastal shipping transport.
Otherwise the Korean economy would not be able to reach targets of produc-
tion and income. The higher costs of coastal shipping are a result of the
longer distances involved to connect the same points by sea as compared
with land transport. Between Mug Ho port in the northeast and Seoul, for
instance, there are 950 km by sea to In Cheon and an additional land naul
of 32 km to Seoul. The direct rail connection is only 310 km. Comparisons
of total transport costs between rail and coastal shipping are given in
Annex 9, paragraph 1. The revised railway investment plan is therefore
clearly economically justified. The detailed rates of return have been
calculated only for those items which are to be financed by the proposed
loan/credit.
B. Economic Benefits
5.04 These items would increase KNR's capacity to meet traffic re-
quirements and would help to improve efficiency and reduce the cost of
various railway operations. New freight cars and diesel locomotives are
needed to meet the present shortage of transport capacity to haul the
anticipated growth in traffic volumes and to assist in the replacement of
over-age equipment. New telecommunication equipment is required to replace
obsolete and over-age installations which are presently unreliable and in-
sufficient to satisfy KNR's needs. The track maintenance equipment to be
provided under the project would help modernize present operations which
are mostly manual, reducing costs and improving quality of works. All
benefits are discussed in detail in Annex 9. The economic rates of return
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on these items are estimated to be: freight cars, 26%; diesel locomotives,
16%; telecommunication equipment, 17%; and track maintenance equipment,
32% with an overall return of 23%.
5.05 Not included in the quantifiable benefits are savings in freight
travel time, savings caused by reduced inventories of industries, relia-
bility of communications and better quality of mechanized maintenance.
All the benefits have been conservatively estimated and show the project
to be economically well justified and of high economic priority.
6. FINANCES AND EARNINGS
A. Tariffs
6.01 KNR, in common with all Government enterprises, must have its
tariffs approved by the Government, after review by a rate making
"Committee for Decisions on Utility and Public Enterprise Commodity
Rates," headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, assisted by four ministers
and ten other qualified persons.
6.02 Details of the freight rate and passenger fare structure are
given in Annex 10. Tariffs are generally low, but as agreed under Credits
25-KO and llO-KO, increases were granted in 1964, 1965 and 1967 as follows:
Freight Rates Passenger Fares
January 1, 1964 15% 15%
January 1, 1965 15% 35%
October 1, 1967 30% 50%
These increases have barely matched cost increases, particularly in the
case of freight rates which have been held at low levels as a Government
policy. The average revenue per ton-km of W 1.41 in 1968 is equivalent
to only USO.83 cents per ton-mile, which is low by any international
standard.
6.03 As required under Credit llO-KO, in addition to the increases
effective October 1, 1967, tariffs were to be revised as necessary to
bring rates and fares into relationship with the costs of the services
provided, taking into account the recommendations of consultants now
engaged to study KNR's costs and tariff structure. The consultants,
mentioned in paragraph 3.02, are expected to complete their work and
present their report by April 1970.
6.04 As of May 20, 1969, KNR expanded the existing three freight
rate categories to five, increasing the rates on certain commodities
as shown in Annex 10. The general effect is to raise the average
revenue per ton-km from W 1.42 to W 1.63. In a full year total freight
revenue would be increased by about 15% or W 1.3 billion based on 1968
traffic.
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6.05 KNR requested Government permission for an across-the-board
increase on all tariffs, to be effective January 1, 1970, in order to com-
pensate for rising costs affected by wage awards and other inflationary
factors. The Government agreed only to a 35% increase in passenger fares,
effective on December 27, 1969. Trhis increase, which has been taken into
account in forecasting the 1970 and 1971 revenues, would be sufficient to
produce a rate of return of about 6.4% in 1970, but further selective
adjustments in tariffs will be necessary in 1971 in order to offset rising
costs, to provide adequate working capital and to reach a rate of return
of no less than 7%. Such tariff increases should be related to fully
distributed costs but should also take into account conditions of competi-
tion on alternative modes of transport. Agreement on this was obtained
during negotiations.
B. Operating Results
(i) Actual
6.06 The income accounts for the years 1964-1968 are given in Table 10.
Except for 1966, when rising costs were not matched by tariff increases,
annual net revenue has shown a steady rise, together with an improved oper-
ating ratio. Summary figures are given below.
W Billion
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Operating Revenue 10.4 13.1 15.7 19.9 27.4
Working Expenses 7.7 9.6 12.7 14.6 17.5
Depreciation 2_ 2.0 2.2 2.5 3.7
Operating Expenses 9.8 11.6 14.9 17.1 21.2
Net Operating Revenue 0.6 1.5 0.8 2.8 6.2
Other Income (loss) 0.6 0.2 0.3 ( 0.1 0.9
Interest Charges 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.3
Net Income 0.8 1.4 0.7 1.8 5.8
Operating ratio Z 94 89 95 86 77
6.07 Interest and debt coverage ratios, varying between 2.9 and 5.7
and 4.1 and 7.1, respectively, were adequate over the period. Depreciation
was about 13% of gross operating revenue and 3% of average gross deprecia-
ble fixed assets, which is reasonable.
6.08 The rate of return on average net fixed assets in use, varying
between 1.5% and 2.5% during 1965, 1966 and 1967, was inadequate for KNR
to generate sufficient funds for investment, and the Government and KNR
agreed, under Credit llO-KO, to increase tariffs sufficiently to improve
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the return to not less than 5% for the years 1969 and 1970, rising to
not less than 6% thereafter. The tariff increases of October 1, 1967
resulted in the rate of return improving to 4.4% in 1968.
6.09 KNR is not required to make a contribution from its net revenues
to Government, but is expected to finance investment, replacements and debt
service from its own earnings, assisted by long-term foreign loans or short-
term local finance and, where necessary, by capital grants from Government.
(ii) Future
6.10 The operating income and expenditure forecast 1969-1971 is also
given in Table 10. It reflects tariff increases discussed in paragraphs
6.04 and 6.05. It also takes into account the cost of moving the growing
traffic expected over the period, and the effect of substantial rises in
wages and salaries expected in each year, and of other cost increases;
on the other hand, allowance has been made for economies which should
result from increased dieselization, improved operations and other mea-
sures to increase efficiency, expected to materialize during this period.
6.11 Gross operating revenue is expected to rise from W 27.4 billion
in 1968 to W 47.6 billion in 1971, while operating expenses, including de-
preciation based on the replacement value of all depreciable fixed assets,
would increase from W 21.2 billion in 1968 to W 39.5 billion in 1971.
6.12 The following is a summary of operating income and expenditure
forecasts during the period 1969-1971. Firm figures for 1969 are not yet
available, but the forecast has been revised to allow for the latest
information available.
Gross Net
Operating Working Cash Operating Operating
Revenue Expenses Surplus Depreciation Revenue Ratio
(in W Billion) X
1969 31.7 21.4 10.3 4.1 6.2 80
1970 42.9 27.2 15.7 4.3 11.4 73
1971 47.6 34.5 13.1 5.0 8.1 83
6.13 The operating ratio, which was 77 in 1968, is expected to im-
prove to 73 in 1970, but to rise to 83 in 1971 at the end of the Project
period, unless tariffs are increased. Times interest ratios, between 3.6
and 6.2, and debt coverage ratios, between 2.6 and 3.6, assessed in accord-
ance with assumptions explained in paragraph 6.23, are both satisfactory.
6.14 The rate of return on average net fixed assets in use during
1969 (3.7%) did not reach the level of 5% agreed under credit 110-KO but
should improve substantially to 6.4% in 1970 following a 35% increase in
passenger fares made in late 1969. As shown in Table 10, given forecast
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increases in wages and other costs, the return on net fixed assets will
decline to 3.4% in 1971, unless KNR takes action to reduce costs and/or
make selective tariff increases (with an overall incidence of the order of
15%). It was agreed during negotiations that to enable KNR to generate
sufficient funds to maintain adequate working canital and to finance a
material part of its capital expenditures, it will take the necessary steps
to earn a rate of return of not less than 7% from 1971 on.
C. Financial Position
6.15 KNR's balance sheets as of December 31, 1966-1968 are shown
in Table 11 and summarized below:
W Billion
1966 1967 1968
Assets
Net fixed assets (including work
in progress) 79.5 168.4 175.3
Current assets 4.3 4.9 12.5
Other assets 2.7 2.6 2.9
Total Assets 86.5 175.9 190.7
Liabilities
Current liabilities 3.8 5.1 12.0
Debt 11.9 18.5 22.8
Equity (including retained
earnings and capital surplus) 70.8 152.3 155.9
Total Liabilities 86.5 175.9 190.7
6.16 KNR's first physical inventory and valuation of fixed assets
was completed in 1965, and the book value of the assets was adjusted in
that year. The National Property Law requires the revaluation of Na-
tional Controlled Real Property every five years. However, as required
under a USAID loan (No. 489-H-037) of 1966, KNR carried out a further
revaluation of its fixed assets as of December 31, 1966, which took into
account the devaluation of the Won, in 1964, of almost 100%, and the
considerable increase in the value of land owned by KNR. The revaluation
increased the gross value of fixed assets by W 75.4 billion, and capital
surplus was increased correspondingly.
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6.17 The composition of the long-term debt as of December 31, 1968,
is given in Table 12. The terms of the major loans range from 15 to 25
years, with an average interest rate of about 6%. The debt equity ratio
at 13/87 is satisfactory.
6.18 The current ratio as of December 31, 1968, at about 1.0, was low,
but should improve when tariffs are raised, improving KNR's generation of
funds. The cash balance at about W 0.2 billion is unsatisfactory but
usually it increases substantially in January when current accounts with
Government are settled.
D. Cash Requirements
6.19 KNR's actual and estimated cash needs and sources of funds
over the Plan period 1967-1971 and the Project period 1970-1971 are de-
tailed in Table 9 and are summarized below.
Plan Period Project Period
1967-1971 1970-1971
(Won Billion) ( Won Billion)
Funds Required
Capital Investment: Local Funds 46.2 22.0
Foreign Exchange 42.5 25.5
Total Funds Required 88.7 47.5
Funds Available
From Borrowing:
Foreign - Existing loans 11.4 0.3
- Proposed loans 20.2 20.2
Local Loans:
Korean Exchange Bank (for foreign
exchange) 2.9
Other (for foreign
exchange) 4.3 2.0
Korean Reconstruction Bank
(for local costs) 1.7
Sub-Total Borrowing 40.5 22.5
From KNR internally generated funds (net) 42.5 20.4
From Government, as capital grant 5.7 4.6
Total Funds Available 88.7 47.5
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6.20 For the period 1967-1971, net cash generated from operations,
W 42.5 billion, together with capital grants from Government of W 5.7 billion
and a loan of W 1.7 billion from the Korean Reconstruction Bank (W 49.9
billion in all) would finance all local currency costs of capital investment
(W 46.2 billion) leaving a surplus of W 3.7 billion. Of the foreign ex-
change cost of investment (W 42.5 billion equivalent), W 11.4 billion would
come from existing foreign loans, and W 16.8 billion from the proposed Bank
loan and IDA credit of US$55 million equivalent, leaving W 14.3 billion to
be secured. KNR is now concluding an agreement to obtain bilateral finan-
cing of about US$57 million, (about W 17.4 billion equivalent), on very
reasonable terms, from a European Conaortium for the electrification project,
of which W 2.7 billion would be available in this period, and has also
obtained bilateral financing of W 0.7 billion from Germany. In addition,
KNR has obtained a loan of W 2.9 billion from the Korean Exchange Bank to
help finance the purchase of passenger cars from Japan and short term
loans from other sources, amounting to W 4.3 billion to help finance the
purchase of rail and passenger cars. This leaves W 3.7 billion which, as
agreed during negotiations, will be provided from Korean Foreign Exchange
(KFX) resources, with KNR reimbursing the Government in local currency, from
the local funds surplus referred to above. In view of the reasonable lend-
ing conditions that have to date been secured, borrowing of the magnitude
indicated above is within the repayment capacity of KNR, and the financial
plan described above is satisfactory.
6.21 Due to the delay in making freight tariff adjustments during
1969, and to the lower than expected tariff increases at the end of 1969,
KNR's generation of funds over the years 1969-1971 is likely to be less
than originally forecast. To cover this gap, the Government gave a capital
grant of W 1.12 billion in 1969, and has promised further grants of W 2.82
billion in 1970 and W 1.8 billion in 1971, a total of W 5.7 billion which
is included in the above financial plan.
6.22 Over the period 1970-71, and assuming foreign firms win all bids,
the foreign exchange requirements of the project are estimated to be US$83.7
million equivalent, as follows:
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US$ Million
(including contingencies)
(a) Items being financed from bilateral
and other sources
(i) Electrification 8.9
(ii) Signalling equipment 2.4
(iii) Track materials 6.6
(iv) Consultants 0.4
(v) Miscellaneous items 0.4
Sub-Total 18.7
(b) Other items: imported goods
(i) 50 Diesel locomotives and spares 19.5
(ii) Track maintenance equipment 2.4
(iii) Telecommunications equipment 2.6
(iv) Consultants and training 0.5
(v) 2,740 Freight cars 30.0
Sub-Total 55.0
(c) Other items: works carried out by KNR
(vi) Materials for bridge strengthening 1.1
(vii) Parts for constructing 240 passenger cars 3.2
(viii) Miscellaneous items for increasing
line capacity 0.5
(ix) 1,000 cars constructed by KNR (estimated
direct and indirect foreign exchange
element) 5.2
Sub-Total 10.0
Total (b) & (c) 65.0
Grand Total 83.7
Against this total, finance amounting to US$18.7 million has been and is
being secured from bilateral, supplier, and other sources (US$8.9 million
for electrification, US$2.4 million for CTC, US$6.6 million for rails and
US$0.8 million for miscellaneous items under existing loans) leaving a
foreign exchange gap of US$65.0 million, of which US$55 million will be
covered by the proposed loan/credit. The remaining US$10.0 million will
come from KFX funds. It is possible that under conditions of international
competitive bidding some or all of the freight car orders will be secured
by Korean firms. This is a new industry in Korea and the Bank has no pre-
vious experience of the capacity and competitiveness of the Korean firms
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which are likely to bid. The local currency component of freight cars
constructed in Korea is estimated at 50%, a total of about US$15 million
equivalent for all 2,740 cars. Should local Korean firms win contracts
for all the cars, US$15 million of the US$30 million loan/credit funds
disbursed against these contracts would be available in effect to cover
the US$10 million foreign exchange gap referred to above, allowing up to
a maximum net contribution from the loan/credit of US$5 million toward the
finance of local currency costs.
6.23 The cash flow (which does not allow for tariff increases in 1971
discussed in paragraph 6.05) has been prepared on the assumption that the
borrowing to be secured would be on tenms ranging from 15 to 25 years,
including two to four years of grace, at about 7% interest. Likewise, it
is assumed that the proposed Bank loan and IDA credit, to be made to the
Government, will be extended to KNR on terms equal to those granted by the
Bank (repayment over 25 years, including four years grace period and at 7%O
annual interest). Agreement was reached during negotiations that, should
the need for financial assistance arise, the Government will make available
to KNR all funds necessary to carry out the Project.
E. Forecast Balance Sheets
6.24 The actual and forecast balance sheet positions as of December
31, 1966-1971 are given in Table 11; those of 1968 and 1971 are summarized
below:
Won Billion
1968 1971
Net Current Assets (0-5) 2.3
Net Fixed Assets 175.3 225.4
Other Assets 2.9 0.1
Total 178.7 227.8
Equity 155.9 183.4
Debt 22.8 44.4
Total 178.7 227.8
Although total debt is expected to increase by some 95% from W 22.8 billion
in 1968 to W 44.4 billion in 1971, the debt/equity ratio should not exceed
20/80 which is favorable. The current ratio should rise to about 1.2 and
the liquid ratio to about 0.7, neither of which are satisfactory, but the
proposed tariff increases discussed in paragraph 6.05 should result in more
working capital becoming available.
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F. Budgets, Accounts and Audit
6.25 Operating and capital budgets are prepared in two forms, one
as laid down for Government departments and the other based on the modern
commercial accounting system installed by consultants financed under Credit
25-KO. Similarly, two sets of accounts are maintained because KNR has not
been able to abandon the Governmental budgetary and accounting rules and
regulations. This has a two-fold effect: (a) the control of the Government
style of accounting by Ministry of Finance auditors is so detailed and
strict that KNR's accounts staff cannot give sufficient care and attention
to the commercial accounting system, leading to many criticisms in the report
of the accountants who audited the 1966, 1967 and 1968 accounts; and (b) the
Government form of budget is so rigid that the Director-General of KNR has
no power to reallocate funds within the budget, such adjustments being au-
thorized only to a limited extent by the Minister of EPB, or they have to
wait approval of revised budgets by the National Assembly. During negotia-
tions it was agreed that (a) commencing January 1, 1971, KNR will abandon
the Governmental budgetarv form of accounting and concentrate solely on
the commercial form of accounts; and its budgets for 1971 onwards will be
prepared in line with the commercial accounting system; (b) commencing
1973, KNR will install a performance budgeting system on the lines of
that devised by consultants financed under Credit 25-KO; and (c) a limited
delegation of power to make budget re-allocations will be granted to the
Director-General of KNR by June 1, 1970.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
7.01 During negotiations agreement was reached with the Government
of the Republic of Korea and KNR on the following principal items:
(i) KNR's revised Second Five-Year Investment Plan and
investment limitation beyond the Plan (para. 4.03);
(ii) diesel locomotive and rail car maintenance study
(para. 3.10), Dae Jeon workshops study (para. 3.20),
telecommunications tudy (para. 3.17) and consultant
assistance in evaluating diesel locomotive and track
maintenance equipment bids (para. 4.05);
(iii) revision of tariffs on cost basis and financial targets
(para. 6.05);
(iv) measutres to increase KNR's financial autonomy (para. 6.25);
(v) co-ordinated action on coal transport problem (para. 3.35)
and re-organization of Government departments and agencies
dealing with transportation.
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7.02 Engagement of the consultants referred to in paragraphs 3.10
and 3.20 would be a condition of effectiveness of the proposed loan and
credit.
7.03 The Project provides a suitable basis for a Bank loan of US$40
million equivalent and an IDA credit of US$15 million equivalent to the
Republic of Korea. A term of 25 years including four years of grace is
recommended for the lEan, and the proceeds of the loan and credit should
be made available by the Government of Korea to KNR on the same terms and
conditions as those granted to the Government by the Bank with respect to
the loan.
March 27, 1970
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TABLE 1
KOREA
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Freight and Passenger Transport by Mode
A. Freight - Billion Ton/Km
Year Railroad Highway Coastal Shipping Total
1958 1.76 0.29 0.24 2.29
1959 2.15 0.32 0.18 2.65
1960 2.48 0.34 0.20 3.02
1961 2.70 0.30 0.24 3.24
1962 3.98 0.38 0.40 4.76
1963 4.36 0.43 0.30 5.09
1964 4.52 0.51 0.40 5.43
1965 5.04 0.50 0.40 5.94
1966 5.45 0.56 0.90 6.91
1967 6.18 o.65 1.20 8.03
1968 6.87 1.02 n.a. n.a.
B. Passengers - Billion of Pass/Km
Year Railroad HighwaY Coastal Shipping Aviation@/ Total
1958 4.17 1.39 0.12 0.02 5.70
1959 4.54 1.79 0.14 0.02 6.49
1960 4.94 2.04 0.15 0.02 7.15
1961 5.37 2.24 0.14 0.02 7.77
1962 5.87 5.46 0.15 0.02 11.50
1963 6.68 6.57 0.17 0.03 13.45
1964 7.35 6.46 0.19 o.o6 14.06
1965 6.92 7.98 0.18 0.07 15.15
1966 8.66 11.46 0.20 0.06 20.38
1967 9.56 11.70 0.22 o.o6 21.54
1968 10.59 13.72 0.23 n.a. n.a.
Source: EPB
I/ Domestic traffic on2ly.
December 11, 1969
TABLE 2
KOREA
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Number of Registered Motor Vehicles
(1964-1968)
Average Annual
Rate of Increase
End of Period 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1964-68
Cars 14,58 6 16,280 20,328 25,710 32,099 21%
Trucks 14,951 16,015 19,432 22,955 28,728 10%
Buses 7,600 8,422 9,384 10,746 12,152 12%
Special Vehicles 678 794 1,016 1,286 1,223 16%
TOTAL 37,815 41,511 50,16o 60,697 74,202 18%
Source: Ministry of Transportation
December 11, 1969
TABLE 3
KOREA
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Composition of Motive Power and Rolling Stock as of December 31, 1966 and 1968 with
1971 Forecasts (excluding narrow gauge lines
Actual Forecast 1971 over 1966
3366 1968 1971 + or -
1. YIotive Power
Steam locomotives 242 115 115 -127
Diesel shunting locomotives 13 14 34 + 21
Diesel mainline locomotives 160 238 298 +138
Diesel railcar-motor units 166 161 15 
Total (excluding steam) 33 U - +15
2. Passenger Car Stock 2
Passenger and sleeping cars 1,283 1,336 1,720 +437
Mail and baggage cars 115 195 195 + 80
Railcar trailers 16 163 16 0
Total 1,661 ,694 2,078S +517
Heater vans 51 119 167 +116
3. F,teight Car Stock
Box cars 4,113 4,482 7,300 ,+J187
Gondolas 3,403 3,966 3,600 + 197
Hopper cars 1,471 1,666 2,300 + 829
Talk cars 952 1,826 1,800 + 848
Other 1,l00 1.299 2.000 + 900
Total 11,039 13,239 17,000 +5.961
Notes: / Narrow gauge lines: (126 kmr)are steam operated.j Passenger cars: 1966-1971
Importation 236
Local construction 410
Scrapping
Total addition
* instead of 300 cars scheduled to be scrapped
Freight cars:
procurement (import and/or local) 4585
Local construction 26h0
Scrapping 1264*
Total additions 9-61
* by age, about 2000 zarsshould be phased out, but some must be
rebuilt locally and retained in service
March 3, 1970
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U&_Pss;8-er_hftid
(1964.-68. Actual; 1969-72: Porec"t)
1961. 1965 1966 1967 1968 1.969 1970 i1n 2
P PK AD P 1 AD P PK D AD p I All 9 A PK AD P P1 A F P D P AD
1. Coin.t..rs ~32.9 .731. 22.2 322 .1 5 38.1. .830 21.6 4.1.6 .883 21.2 387 88 7 -4.91 1.04.1 221 46.1 .2 20 5. .3 20 5..127 2.
2. Lung Dlistaoc 83.8 6.107 72.8 73.3 5.710 77.8 98.0 7.288 71. 3 106.1. 8.150 75.2 no.6 9.280 83.9 io. 6 9.74.1 80.7 131.D.6 10.657 80.9 139.5 11.51. 82.7 p.16.8 12.553 J.5!
3. N1It.Uy 1.9 .5i 271.0 .8 12 26.7 19 ,6 _13 3go.9 1.6 J87A 1i - 2.0 _08 890I2.0 .578 289.0 2.0 .578 289.0 I. _K7A IA-~4
4. Total 115. 67.353 681. 107. 3 6.98? 64..5 138.3 8.664. :62.6 152.0 9.7 63.6 1101.9 70.1 172.0 :11.363 66.0 1180.0 12.256 68.0 1193.0 13.260 68.7 12.60o 214.418 69D3
P. KAiUg Pa..o.gws
PK: Billion Pasaa.gw-ku Sourcet 1964.-6 figure: MIIIL
1969-72 KNR, relioed bY Beak 342s.o.
AD. kvwage Dilatoms.- Ka
D.o.b.r 13, 1.969

TABLE 6
KOREA Page 1
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Summary of Operating Statistics (all traffic)
I. SYSTEM 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Route-km km 3,039 2,954 2,980 3,063 3,105 3,234
II. TRAFFIC
Pass. carried million 109.3 118.5 107.2 138.3 152.0 151.0
Pass-km million 6,576 7,353 6,917 8,664 9,577 10,590
Freight tons carried-
Total million 19.8 20.3 22.4 24.1 27.4 28.9
Freight net ton-km million 4,358 4,522 5,043 5,450 6,178 6,865
Traffic units-Total million 10,934 11,875 11,960 14,114 15,755 17,455
III. TRAFFIC DENSITY
Pass-km per route-km 000 2,164 2,489 2,321 2,829 3,084 3,275
Freight net ton-km per
route-km 000 1,434 1,531 1,692 1,779 1,990 2,123
IV. OPERATIONS
Train-km by mode of
traction
Steam 000 8,918 5,579 6,879 7,713 2,834 490
Diesel 000 13,149 16,275 17,002 17,924 23,455 28,183
Railcars 000 2,939 5,787 6,164 6,433 9,270 8,803
Total 000 25,oo6 27,641 30,045 32,070 35,559 37,476
Engine-km
Steam 000 13,443 9,906 11,636 13,181 6,836 3,424
Diesel 000 15,546 19,116 19,088 21,208 29,742 35,539
Railcars 000 5,186 9,439 9,060 10,150 17,894 16,691
Total 000 34,175 38,461 39,784 44,539 54,472 55,654
Number of engines
in fleet
Steam 280 272 272 242 205 115
Diesel 125 125 125 173 l 238 252
Railcar 81 80 77 163.& 163 161
Total 486 477 474 578 606 528
Engine-km/engine-day in
fleet
Steam km 132 100 117 139 151 82
Diesel km 341 419 417 428 380 386
Railcar km 176 323 322 320 300 287
Availability of diesel
locomotives % 78 97 97 98 97 95
Availability of diesel
railcars % 50 86 85 58./ 80 82
Ehgine-km/ongirm-day Avail
Diesel km 455 433 431 436 393 411
Railcar km 356 375 376 385 377 349
TABLE 6
Page 2
1963 1264 1965 1966 1967 1968
V. OPERATING EFFICIENCY
Traffic unit/engine unit
in fleet 000,000 22.,5 24.9 25.2 28.9" 31.5 33.2
Pass-km/train-km 437 431 398 439 443 466
Pass-km/pass car in
fleet 000,000 4.1 5.8 5.0 6.2 6.9 7.7
Pass-km/pass car-km 62.0 59.2 54.4 62.9 63.7 68.7
Net ton-km/freight cars
in fleet 000 416 422 476 495 510 519
Number of freight cars
loaded 000 669 665 735 765 821 803
Average turn-around of
freight cars day 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.6
Average load of freight
cars ton 28.8 29.1 29.5 30.6 31 32
VI. STAFF EFFICIENCY
Number of permanent
employees 26,218 27,639 9,548 29,976 33,413 35,192
Traffic unit/employee 000 417 429 405 471 472 496
Employees per route-km 8.63 9.36 9.92 9.78 10.76 10.88
Number of employees per
1000 train-km 1.05 1.0 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.94
48 locomotives delivered at varying times through 1966 gave equivalent of 10 additional
locomotives in full year.j 1 railcar rebuilt; 85 railcars delivered at varying times throughout 1966 gave
equivalent of 18 additional railcars in full year.
j divisor of 487 (257 steam + 135 diesel + 95 railcars).
December 11, 1969
KOREA
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
1,7-19 71 Investment Plan (Summary)
1967 - 196- 1969 1970 - 19?1 Totaql 1967 - 1971
(Pro,ect Period)
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
W mil US$ 000 W mil W mil US$ 000 w mil W mil US$ 000 W mil W mil j$00 W mil
1. Construction of New
Lines 5506 635 5680 311 - 311 1254 - 1254 7071 635 7245
2. Increase in Station
and Line capacity 4839 1945 5370 4298 279 4379 9808 11349 13270 18945 13573 23019
3. Way and Structure
Renewals & Improvement 1627 802 1846 1201 3007 2073 1998 9704 4958 4826 13513 8877
4. Motive Power and
Rolling Stock 2853 33235 11243 1992 20728 8003 3917 55900 20969 8762 109863 40215
5. Rolling Stock Equipment
& Construction 682 54 696 327 1793 847 539 - 539 1548 1847 2082
6. Miscellaneous 303 25 310 239 1488 380 11441 3455 2495 1983 3968 _ 3185
7. Total 15810 36696 25145 8368 26295 15993 18957 80408 43485 b3135 143399 84623
8. Contingencies 3041 3322 4051 3041 3322 4051
9. Grand Total 15810 36696 25145 8368 26295 15993 21998 83730 47536 46176 146721 88674
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KOREA
THIRD RA-LWAT PRO,JECT
1967-1971 IOcsst,,mt Plan
(1967/68 Actual, 1969-71 Forecast)
Units ~TOTAL COST 1967 (ACT¶7L b ATJL1969 _________ 1970 1971
Dcring L.oal Freign- Total Lo.al 'oF-ign Total L11ial '0j 96T6 .tal L-.1T Foein otT ocltA611 Local US Fr0g Motll
Period W mi _lo 0$ 0OO miJllion W million 02$ 000 W million W million us$ 000 U million W million S$ 000 milo ilo S 00 8 illion UmIlo UW 00 U Ilion~
1. C-ot-otiOn of new Li-e
i) Gy ... g J-on 2,116 - 2.116 1.721 - 1,721 695 - 695- ------
II) J.e.ng Seon 1,238 209 1,296 422 4 22 476 209 534 71 71 266 -266-
iii) la.., Gy.ong 5410 126 571 82 8 2 458 126 192 --------
Ic Bi :~136 136 36 - 36 12 - 12 - 29 -29 59 59
J-an Hang 115 1 15 - - - 15 15 - - 150 -150 250 -250
p1 ioll. csInutil pc 2,150 700 2,232 224 221 1,109 200 1,071 237 - 237 263 - 263 237 -237
Ml) iceila-ouse io. Priority L10cm 176 - 176 176 - 176 - -- -------
lob Totol. 7,071 625 2,215 2.66i - 2,661 2,915 635 3.019 311 - 311 708 - 708 516 -516
2. In 'ea.e in Station and Line Gapa-ity
i) S.oml Are 5,917 1,296 6,285 411 036 642 775 - 775 1,531. 1,534 1,651 200 1,715 1,510 260 1,619
ii) Doable Tr-cicg 1,581 196 1,638 18 - 18 420 96 116 105 - 105 254 - 254. 754 100 785
iii) Marshalling nod Otatio- Tad ,962 624 0,110 299 - 299 338 15 351 275 279 356 500 150 51.6 550 iSO 596
i,) Loading and Offloadiog Facilities 3,322 - 3,322 317- 317 872- 872 1,510 - 1,516 263 - 263 322 - 322
p7 Electrification 2,699 8,289 5,227 - - - 45 4 5 237 237 950 2,060 1,560 1.167 6,289 3,385
ci) Boildiog Impro-et. end inlargenants 652 - 652 32 - 32 180 - 18 57 57 160 - 160 215 - 215
,li) ligoalling n-d Track Eoteosio 2,812 3,169 3,717 64Q 666 822 151 302 53 542 5j**2 579 1.100 915* 600 1.000 9352i...
Sub Totals 18,915 13,573 23,019 1,750 1,502 2,160 3,089 113 3,210 1,298 279 4,379 1,360) 3,150 5,113 5,119 7,899 7,857
3, Way and Strutur -tnsaend Ipcro--nots
i) Trak (B3ed, T i-s, Railo) 1,362 10,000 7,311 688 - 688 87' 902 0,096 1,127 3,007 1,999 895 3,000 0,810 775 3,131 1,719
ii) Tuonels, Bridgem and St-oe rtsna 160 1,013 900 62 - 62 - - -70 - 70 50 170 102 279 913 566
001) Equipnen't 4 2,100 736 -- - - - - 1 - I - 200 61 - 2.200 671
lob Totale 1,026 13,113 0,877 750 - 750 87' 802 1,096 1,201 3,007 2,073 945 3,370 1,973 1,053 6,334 2,985
4. Motive Powe nod Rolling Stock
i) Loo...oi-ce 160 11,97? 12,310 39 15,006 1,370 29q 518 030 15 6,068 1,770 3 2,000o 613 11 17,500 5,350
ii) Pasenger Cam 1/ 2,918 19,806 8,693 61. - 64 719 2,226 1,357 900 11,660 5,151 700 1,700 1,219 505 1,300 902
iii) PreLg2t Oar, 5,351 1.6,505 18,112 1,235 735 1,435 677 12,370 3,327 1,177 - 1,077 1,118 014,500 5,521 1,217 18,900 6,982
tel Wreking Crane ad Contal...s 330 1,5000 74c0 - 1.368 371 - 132 36 - - 330 - 330 - - -
lob Tot.ls 9,762 109,063 10,215 1,330 17,997 6,213 1,510 15,216 5,000 1,992 20,728 8,003 2.181 10.200 7,733 1.736 37,700 13,236
5. R.lliog Stock Eooipment nod Constratico
0) Sheds and PacIliti.s 901 - 901 192 - 192 168 - 168 327 - 322 030 - 130) 91 - 84
oi) Plant and Eqip-x,et 617 1,017 1,191 11 54 159 178- 178 I - 1.793 520 325 32 - - -
Sub Totals 1,548 1,947 2,082 336 51 350 346 - 346 327 1,793 012 155 4 55 84 - 9
6. misceflanous
1) Coo.Ia,oo1,170 2,675 2,292 38 - 38 195 - 195 194 95 221 262 - 262 783 2,600 1,576
1i) Electric Power nod Lighting 264 - 261 10 15 43 4 3 20 - 20 900 90 96- 96
iii) Office Eqoip-et, etc. 102 - 102 2 - 2 - - - - - - so - 5o so - S
tel OConsultnt Sereice 115 1,273 527 - - -10 25 17 25 393 139 55 635 219 55 220 122
lob Totmb 1,903 3,968 3,105 55 - 55 248 25 255 239 188 300 457 635 651 981 2,020 1,811
7. T.tal 13,135 113,399 81,623 6 089 51 12.219 8.920 17.151 12. 926 8,368 26,295 15,993 9,106 25,655 16.933 9,9514 54.753) 26,552
B. Cont 21nto 3,011 3,122 1,051 -- --- --- 1.165 1,105 I.9C2 176 2172.249
9. Grand Tot.l 46,176 1J16,721 80,671 6,89c 19,515_ 12,219 9,920 17,151 12,926 ,39 26,295 15,993 10.571 26,760 18,735 112 ,?5 28.001
I/' i-oludes 116 henret car
2/ i, 1970 and 1071 only
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KOREA TABLE
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Cashi Flow Statement 1967-1Q71
(Won Billions)
T(TTAL
1lo(q 1"Q8 1969 1970 1971 L"71)- ' L" - 1
7 CTUt (7 F 0 R E C A S T ) (Project (Plan
Period) Period)
lAIN It; lEQU01REfP 1,0R INVESTMENT P(ROGRAM
kooit Fun.B 6.89 8.92 8.37 10.57 il.43 22.0C 46.18
I.,roigoi F,lloh:mt 5.33 4.00 7.62 8.17 17.37 25.54 42.49
I',)tal FNnds Requirpd 12.22 12.Q2 15.99 18.74 28.80 47.54 88.67
_ .1NI1 AVAILAL E,1^;
A. Fr.m KNIl
I. Not. Income' before Interest 2.82 7.12 6.65 11.82 8.40 20.22 36.81
' Depreri.:ion 2.54 3.68 4.12 4.32 4.97 9.29 i9.63
(aiiw on Sale of Assets 0.13 0.45 0-57 1.25 1.25 2.50 3.6'
Lesn: 5.49 11.25 11.34 17.39 14.62 32.01 00.09
!. Debt. Sorvice:
Inteorest on Loans 0.92 1.31 1.60 1.87 2.36 4.23 8.06
Repayment of Loans 0.38 0.89 2.43 2.93 3.29 6.22 9.92
Total Nebt Service I7.37 = C-7 -TU5D 50 5 10. 1 57.9s 
Working Capital Increase (Decrease) (1.23) (0.32) o.o6 3.48 (2-33) 1.15 (0.34)
Net Funds Available from KNR 5.42 9.37 7.25 9.11 11.30 20.41 42.45
1. From Borrowing
1. Long-term:
i) Existing Foreign Loans:
AID III (USA) 4.72 0.18 0.63 - - - 5.53
CTC (UK) 0.18 0.08 - - - - 0.26
OECF I (Japan) 0.20 - - - 0.20
OECF II (Japan) - 0.61 - 0.12 - 0.12 0.73
IDA Credit 110-KD - 2.68 0.11 0.15 - 0.15 2.94
Eximbank - - 1.76 - - - 1.76
Sub-Total 5.10 3.55 2.50 0.27 - 0.27 11.42
ii) Proposed Foreign Loans:
CTC (Germany) - - - 0.36 0.36 0.72 0.72
Proposed IBRD Loan - - - 4.54 12.23 16.77 16.77
Loan for Electrification - o - 0.66 2.06 2.72 2.72
Sub-Total - . _ _ 5.56 14.65 20.21 20.21
Total Foreign Loans 5.10 T755 2.50 5.83 14.65 20.18 31.63
iii) Local Loans:
Korean Reconstruction Bank 1.70 - - - - 1.70
Korean Exchange Bank -- 2.90 - - 2.90
Total Local Loans 1.70 - 2.90 - - 14.60
Short-term for:
Rail - - 0.87 0.98 1.05 2.03 2.90
Passenger cars _ - 1.35 - - - 1.35
Total short-term loans - - 2.22 0.98 1.05 2.03 4.25
From Borroving 6.80 3.55 7.62 6.81 1570 22.51 To.WT
CF'rtm Govlernmoint
C-- From Government- - 1.12 2. 1.oO tio[.62 5.7)
TOTAI, FINDS AVAILABLE (A & B & C) 12.22 12.92 15.99 18.74 28.80 47.54 88.67
March 3, 1970
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Income Accounts 1964 - 1971
(Actual : 1964-1968)
(Forecast : 1969-1971) (Won Billion)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
( AC T U A L ) (FORECAST)
OPERATING REVENIUE
Passenger revenue 5.32 6.57 8.38 10.68 15.49 18.59 25.45 27.42
Freight revenue 4.50 5.54 6.05 7.38 9.74 11.71 13.70 16.04
Other operating revenue 0.55 0.98 1-34 1.85 2.18 1.39 3.80
Total operating revenue 10.37 13.09 15.77 19.91 27.41 31.69 42.95 47.55
OPERATING EXPFNSES
Operating expenses before depreciation 7.71 9.60 12.70 12.55 17.50 21.34 27.21 34.48
Depreciation provision 2.05 1.99 2.23 2.54 3.68 4,1.2 4.32 4.97
Total operating expenses 9.76 L1.59 14.93 17.09 21.18 25.46 31.53 39-45
Net operating revenue 0.61 1.50 0.84 2.82 6.23 6.23 11.42 8.10
NQn-operating revenue/loss (net) 0.55 0.16 0.32 (0.09) 0.89 0.42 40 30
Net revenue before interest 1.66 1.66 1.16 2.73 7.12 6.65 11.82 8.40
Interest charges 0.35 0.29 0. 0.92 1.31 1.60 1.87 2*.36
Net revenue 0.81 1.37 0.73 1.81 5.81 5.05 9.95 6.04
RATIOS:
Operation ratio 94 95 56 77 73 '3 v
Times interest earned 3.3 5.7 2.7 3.1 5.L .2 6. 3.6
Debt coverage 5.6 7.1 L.< 4.1 ! . 3., 2.,
Rc-+11.1. or average net fixed assets in use () -N,/A 2'.5 1., .. -. .,.
Ya):?h 3, 1?7C
KOR_A TABLE 11
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1966-1971
(Won billion)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
------ ACTUAL-- - ------ RECAST--------
ASSETS
Fixed Asset '
Land, buildings, machinery & equipment 89.0 171.0 181.5 197.5 216.2 245.0
Less accumsulated depreciation 9.5 2.6 6.2 10.3 14-6 19.6
Net fixed assets 79.5 168.4 175.3 187.2 201.6 225.4
Cuirrenbt Assets:
Cash 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.2
Inven torles 2.3 2.6 5.9 6.3 6.9 7.0
Other current assets 1.8 2.1 6-4 7.2 10.3 9.1
Total current assets 4.3 4.9 12.5 13.7 18.3 17.3
Investmnents 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dtiferred assets 2.6 2-5 2.8 L29 0292
Total Assets 86.5 175.9 190.7 202.9 220.9 242.8
LI ABILITIES
Zqu ity
Fixed capital 65.0 65.o 65.0 66.1 68.9 70.7
Capital surplus 3.1 78.4 76.6 76.6 76.6 76.6
Farned surplus 2.7 8.9 14-3 19.6 29.7 36.1
Total equity 70.8 152.3 155.9 162.3 175.2 183.4
Debt
Foreign loans 10.0 14.9 19.2 21.5 26.3 39.9
Local borrowing 1.9 3.6 3.6 6.5 5.7 4.5
Total debt 11.9 18.5 22.8 28.0 32.0 44-h
Current liabilities 3.8 5.1 12.0 12.6 13.7 15.0
Total liabilities 86.5 175.9 190.7 202.9 220.9 242.8
RATIOS:
Current assets to current liabilities 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.2
Current assets less inventories to
current liabilities 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7
Debt to equity 14/86 11/89 13/87 15/85 15/85 20/80
Marclh 3, 1)70
TABLE 19
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Composition of Debt as of December 31, 1968
Tear US$ million Won Repayment Rate of Amotmt.
Class of Loan Contracted equivalent million Period Interest Outstanding
(years) ((Won m .ilinn)
A. FOREIGN
1. IDA Relending (25-KO) 1962 14.o 3,759 25 5.75 3,0U4
2. IDA Relending (llO-KD) 1967 11.0 3,003 25 6.o 2,68,2
3. US AID I 1962 6.4 1,735 21 5.75 1,38?
4. US AID II 1965 10.7 2,875 21 5.75 2,581l
5. US AID III 1966 18.5 4,760 15 5.75 3,787
6. Japan (OECF) I 1966 11.9 3,276 20 5.75 2,992
7. Japan (OECF) II 1966 9.3 2,570 20 5.75 2,1W5
8. U.K. (C.T.C.) ~~~~~~~~~~~about
8. U.K. (C.T.C.) - 1965 1.4 320 15½ 7.0 320
9. Export-Import Bank 1968 6.0 1,760 7 6.o _
Total Foreign Loans 89.2 24,o58 19,2143
B. LOCAL
10. Korean Reconstruction Bank 1966 13.0 3,571 25 6.o 3,571
11. Korean Exchange Bank 1968 10.0 2,800 4 6.5 -
Total Local Loans 23.0 6,371 3,571
GRAND TOTAL 112.2 30,429 22,814
March 3, 1970
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KOREA
THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Government Agencies Dealing with Transport
1. The Ministry of Transportation (MOT) is responsible for railroad
and civil aviation infrastructure works. It fully controls transport oper-
ations for all modes, issues regulations, delivers licenses, performs cost
calculations, sets rates and fares, collects transport statistics and un-
dertakes research. It carries out its activities through four bureaus -
Land Transportation, Marine Transportation, Civil Aviation and Tourism -
and exerts control over KNR.
2. The Ministry of Construction (HOC) is responsible for planning,
construction snd maintenance of highways and ports. It controls the
Korean Highway Corporation, created in January 1969, which is in charge of
constructing, maintaining and operating toll roads.
3. The Economic Planning Board (EPB) reviews and makes final deci-
sions on transport investment programs. The Deputy Prime Minister who is
Chairman of EPB is advised by the Economic Plan Committee (EPC). EPC is
chaired by the Vice-Minister of EPB and is formed by Vice-Ministers of
major ministries and other specially appointed members. Within the EPC,
the Transportation and Communications Committee (further subdivided into
two subcommittees) is in charge of appraising projects submitted by the
ministries and agencies.
4. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) is responsible for
farm and forestry roads.
5. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) is responsible for
promoting and supervising the assembling industries for motor vehicles,
railway rolling stock and shipbuilding.
6. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible for establishing and
collecting taxes in relation to transportation.
7. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) is the supreme head of all
local government; it administers various taxes, such as the vehicle and the
acquisition tax to help finance transport works by local authorities. MOHA
is also in charge of the highway police.
8. To solve current problems the Government recently created two
committees: the Committee Ad Hoc for Planning Overall Transport Measures
(CAH) and the Transportation Coordination Committee (TCC).
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(a) The CAH, created in June 1968, was to propose measures
concerning the general transportation policy. Its
members are the ministers of MOT, MOC, MOCI and a
member of the Economic and Scientific Council. It
is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, and a
Minister without portfolio is acting as executive
secretary with a small staff. This committee has
produced so significant results.
(b) The TCC is also composed of representatives of
various ministries and is chaired by the Vice-
Minister of MOT. Its tasks are to solve urgent
problems arising from considerable arrears in
transport of basic goods such as coal, fuel, grain,
fertilizer, cement and military goods. KNR has to
observe the priorities fixed by the TCC for the
allocation of freight cars.
November 15, 1969
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Draft Terms of Reference
Cbnsiiltants for Diesel Motive Power Maintenance and Workshops Requirements
I. PREAMBLE
It has been agreed between the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development and the Korean Government that Consultants will
be engaged to undertake assignments as outlined in these terms of refer-
ence for the Korean National Railroad (KNR). The Consultants will carry
out the assignments with the full cooperation of the Korean Government
and of KNR. The Consultants will perform all economic, financial, organ-
izational and technical studies as necessary to achieve the objectives
set forth. The Consultants will be solely responsible for the analysis
and interpretation of all data received or collected and for the conclusions
and recommendations contained in their report.
II. STUDIES
1. Diesel motive power maintenance
(i) Objectives: The purpose of this study is to ensure that
the Korean National Railroad (KNR) obtains the advantage
of most recent technical experience in the maintenance
and repair of diesel locomotives and diesel railcars.
This study is to improve availability of diesel railcars
from the present 82% towards 92% and to help diesel loco-
motives to give a better quality of service by reducing the
rate of failure from the present 25 casualties towards 10
per million-km.
(ii) Scope: The study will include:
(a) definition of periodic maintenance cycles adapted
to the various series of diesel locomotives, and
to the railcars.
- visits, checks, periodic inspections, to be
performed by driving personnel or at servicing
points (depots),
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- overhauls and periodic revisions, generally
to be performed in workshops,
- criteria of intervention: time or kilometrage;
(b) consistency of each maintenance operation defined
above, i.e. nature, quantity, and quality of work
to be done at each motive power unit;
(c) organization of maintenance and repair work at
workshop level in order to perform each operation
in the most efficient manner, time criteria being
the most important; review of adequacy of existing
facilities at workshop level for each operation and
recommend improvements;
(d) setting up of a planned maintenance program at
management level, in order to perform periodic
maintenance in the most efficient and economical
manner;
(e) setting up of a coordinated spare parts supply
policy;
(f) setting up of a training program for maintenance
at the various levels requlred:
- execution of maintenance and repair work
- troubleshooting
- supervision, control, investigations.
NOTE: - recommendations that involve expenditure should be quantified,
divided between local and overseas funds, and programmed over a
period of time.
2. Workshops
(i) Objectives: The purpose of this study is to review
the existing workshops with respect to maintenance and
manufacturing operations, present and future, to be
performed on motive power and rolling stock, and to
examine the opportunity to build a new workshop at
Dae Jeon.
(ii) Scope: The study will include:
(a) examination of the adequacy of existing workshops
in relation to present maintenance operations and
semi-manufacturing of rolling stock:
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(b) examination of the possibilities to increase
production, in order to meet future demand, by
improving organization, by specializing of work-
shops, and by limited extensions;
(c) recommendations on improvements required to
existing workshops;
(d) examination of the new workshops proposal at
Dae Jeon, and recommendations as to the opportunity
to build it.
NOTE: - recommendations that involve expenditure should be quantified,
divided between local and overseas funds, and programmed over a
period of time.
III. REPORTS
The Consultants shall submit 10 copies in English to the
Republic of Korea and KNR and 5 copies in English to the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, of the following reports:
(1) An inception report, outlining the methodologies
proposed and the program of operations for their
staff.
(2) Progress reports at three-months' intervals, dating
from submission of the inception report, summarizing
interim findings and indicating any special problems
encountered in the course of the studies.
(3) A draft final report, summarizing all findings, con-
clusions and recommendations of the Consultants,
together with statements, graphs, drawings and plans
as may be required.
(4) A final report, reflecting the comments received from
the Republic of Korea, KNR and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development on the draft final
report.
IV. DATA AND LOCAL SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED
BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND KNR
The Republic of Korea and KNR will make available to the Consul-
tants all relevant data, reports, schedules, maps, plans and other in-
formation necessary for the efficient execution of the studies and shall
cooperate fully.
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KNR will have primary responsibility for all operational arrange-
ments relating to the studies and for the assignment of full-time counterpart
personnel to assist in obtaining information and to observe and make them-
selves fully conversant with the methods, principles and techniques of the
studies.
In addition to the counterpart personnel, KNR will make avail-
able to the Consultants the necessary staff, including interpreters and
translators, required for the collection and processing of data and the
preparation of reports.
KNR will also provide the Consultants with the following facil-
ities and equipment:
(1) Office space (to be defined).
(2) Office utilities, equipment and supplies (to be defined).
(3) Vehicles for use by the Consultants' staff and/or payment
of transportation expenses within Korea.
KNR will also assist the Consultants in locating suitable living
accommodations for their personnel and dependents.
V. PROVISIONAL TIME SCHEDULE
The Consultants shall mobilize their key personnel for this
study within 30 days of the date of the contract under which they shall
be retained.
The inception report shall be submitted within 90 days of the
date of such contract.
The draft final report shall be submitted within 8 months of the
date of such contract.
The Republic of Korea, KNR and the International Bank for Recons-
truction and Development shall submit their comments on the draft final
report within 45 days of submittal of such report.
The final report shall be submitted within 60 days of receipt of
comments from the Republic of Korea, KNR and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development on the draft final report.
November 15, 1969
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THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT
Electrification of 348.6 km of Single-Track Lines
Connecting Seoul to the Northeast of Korea
1. Development of the fast growing cement industry in the North-
eastern part of Korea, together with the anthracite coal and iron ore
mines, builds up heavy traffic between this area and Seoul. Situated in
mountainous country with no highway connections at present, this part of
Korea is linked to Seoul by some 350 km of single track railway divided in-
to three lines: Seoul (Cheong Ryang Ri) - Je Cheon (known as the Jung
Ang line); Je Cheon - Go Han (known as the Tae Baeg line); and Hwang Ji
- Baeg San and Cheol Am - Bug Pyeong (known as the Yeong Dong line).
Though occupying, in route kilometrage, only a little over 10% of the
entire network, these lines are important as they carry about 40% of KNR's
total freight traffic: almost all anthracite coal (the largest single
category of freight, accounting for 10 million tons per year), and cement
(the second largest category of freight, about 3 million tons a year).
2. Total freight carried on these lines in 1968, and that forecast,
are as follows:
million of net tons
Lines Actual Forecast
1968 1971 1976 1981
Jung Ang 7.17 11.54 12.3 13.10
Tae Baeg 2.80 9.22 10.6 11.0
Yeong Dong 0.9 3.2 3.25 3.3
Traffic is mainly flowing from East to West, with much empty return haul-
age, giving at present a 2.15 ratio of gross-ton-km
net-ton-km
3. The three sections of line contain sharp curvatures of 250 m and
400 m, and 101 tunnels throughout the existing 335 route-km. The ruling
grades (not compensated for curves) in the directlon of loaded trains are
1.25% for 16 km on Jung Ang line, 2.50% for 7 km on Tae Baeg line and 3.0%
for 51 km on Yeong Dong line.
4. Various measures have been taken to increase the capacity of the
lines such as assignment of 1800-hp diesel locomotives, installation and
lengthening of crossing loops, and, since October 1968, centralized traffic
control (CTC) on Jung Ang line between Seoul (Mang U) and Bong Yang (148
km). However, with the present train speeds and distances between stations,
the number of trains cannot be increased satisfactorily and the capacity
only meets the demand. The present situation is as follows:
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Maximum Passenger Freight Trans-
Number Number Number portation
of of of capacity
trains trains Aver- trains Aver- Million
per day per day G. Ton- age per day G. Ton- age Net Tons
per di- per di- nage Speed per di- nage Speed
Line rection rection Tons km/h rection Tons km/h
Jung Ang 34 9 600 33.7 25 1740 24.7 9.3
Tae Baeg 20 5 300 27.4 15 740 19.3 2.8
Yeong
Dong 18 3 300 30.7 15 650 21.3 2.0
Total 14.1
Since the main commodity is anthracite coal loaded in the open and carried in
open cars (gondolas or hoppers), water retention occurring in the winter in-
creases the weight of trains and reduces the transportation capacity by 4 to
5 trains daily. There are also many diesel engine failures due to over-
heating because of the long periods requiring sustained heavy power. The
24.5-ton axle load of the largest diesel locomotives causes excessive wear
and damage to the track and makes track maintenance difficult and expensive.
5. To meet growth of traffic, KNR is faced with increasing the trans-
portation capacity of the three lines. Theoretically, this can be obtained
(a) by increasing the train loads/lengths (at same speed), (b) by double
tracking, or (c) by increasing the train speeds (at same load).
(a) Train lengths cannot be increased over the present
standard of 40 to 50 cars per train mainly because
of limitations related to the automatic couplers
and braking requirements in the long descending grades.
It would also be very costly to increase the length
of crossing loops at many stations.
(b) Double tracking, because of the difficulty of the
terrain, would require a long period to carry out and
would be extremely costly - US$230,000 to 280,000 per
km, according to present estimates.
(c) To run trains at the required speed to meet the traffic
demand without double tracking cannot be done economically
by diesel traction. Multi-unit diesel operation in single
track tunnels is liable to result in overheating of diesel
engines and failures; alternatively the power of the diesel
units has to be severely reduced. This factor would mean
the employment of an excessive number of diesel locomotives.
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6. In these circumstances and based on a Japanese study 1/, KNR has
decided to electrify the total route-km of single track line:
Jung Ang line 155.2 km
Tae Baeg line 107.9 km
Yeong Dong line 85.5 km
348.6 km
The Yeong Dong line includes the proposed 13-km connection (including a
4.5-km tunnel) between Go Han - Hwang Ji, which will shorten the hauling
distance between East-West by about 50 km.
7. The entire project, including ground facilities, motive power,
and construction of the proposed connecting line, is estimated to cost
about US$63 million equivalent. Ground facilities, i.e. substations,
overhead wire, modification of signal and communication equipment, is
estimated to cost an average of US$66,000 per km. It is estimated that
the total work can be completed in about three years. Electric traction
will give the following transportation capacity:
Total Passenger Freight Trans-
Number Number Number portation
of of of capacity
trains trains Aver- trains Aver- Million
per day per day G. Ton- age per day G. Ton- age net-tons
per di- per di- nage Speed per di- nage Speed
Line rection rection Tons km/h rection Tons km/h
Jung Ang 50 12 600 65 38 1740 49 14.2
Tae Baeg 40 7 600 55 33 1520 45 11.0
Yeong
Dong 30 7 600 55 23 1520 39 7.4
Total 32.6
8. Korea Electric Company has been installing large capacity thermal
plants and therefore sufficient electric power is available for the intended
electrification. A 154-kv transmission line is running close to the KNR route
to be electrified, and doubling of this transmission line is planned in the
near future. The present average rate per kwh, W 2.75 to 3.25, should not
change in the foreseeable future (10 years), under present economic conditions.
1/ Report on the result of study for electrification of industrial lines.
December 1967 - Japan Railway Technical Service - Tokyo.
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9. KNR has selected a 25-kv, ac, 60-hz electrification system which
requires the least cost for ground facilities and gives the best motive
power possibilities (adhesion) in this difficult and rugged area. Freight
traffic would be handled by 66 locomotives: 3,900-kw, BBB type, 22-ton
axle load. Their daily performance is expected to be 350 km. Maintenance
is scheduled at Je Cheon, centrally located for the electrified lines,
where a suitable building is already available.
10. Passenger traffic would have to be handled mostly by diesel
locomotives and railcars; later it might become advisable to obtain some
2500-kw electric locomotives for this purpose. The 66 electric locomotives
should release about 100 diesel locomotives needed (a) to phase out steam
and (b) to take care of traffic increase.
11. The investment for electrification can be estimated at about
US$63 million equivalent, of which about US$47 million is foreign exchange.
About US$22 million is for general facilities (of wihich US$12 million for-
eign exchange), about US$35 million (all foreign exchange) for motive power
(66 electric locomotives estimated at US$495,000 c.i.f., spare parts and
special tools), and about US$6 million equivalent (with no foreign exchange)
for the 13-km link line.
12. KNR has negotiated a loan, amounting to about US$57 million
equivalent for the electrification project, with a consortium of European
manufacturers (Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland) on satisfactory terms.
The loan is now awaiting ratification by the Governments involved. Construc-
tion work is expected to start in 1970 and electric traction to become
effective by 1973.
13. Assuming the effective date of the contract to be about July 1,
1970, expenditure during 1970 and 1971 is estimated to be as follows:
1970 1971 _ _ Total
Loa Foreii LclFign Total Lc Foreign Total
W mil $ 000 W mil W mil $ 000 W mll W mil $ 000 w mil
i) Ground facilities:
Jung Ang line 350 2,000 960 677 3,914 1,871 1,027 5,914 2,831
Tae Baeg line _ _ _ 190 950 480 190 950 480
Yeong Dong line 
- - - - - -
ii) Connecting Link and
Tunnel 600 _ 600 600 - 600 1,200 - 1,200
iii) Locomotive shed
(equipment) 
_- - 125 38 - 125 38
iv) Locomotives (down
payment) 
_- - 1,200 366 - 1,200 366
v) Technical
assistance - _ 100 30 - 100 31
-,0 2000 1156o I1467 6.289 2.17 8.289 149
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14. To handle the equivalent traffic with diesel traction would re-
quire an investment of about US$40 million in motive power (not taking
into account the technical problems mentioned above).
15. Electrification as compared with diesel traction will result in
a yearly operating saving of about US$1 million equivalent on the basis of
1973 traffic, and of about US$1.5 million equivalent on the basis of 1981
traffic. The expected rate of return is of the order of 20%.
March 3, 1970
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KNR's Investment Plan 1967 - 1971
I. Main Amendments to the Original 1967-1971 Plan as now agreed between
____ 
___ 
KNR and the Bank
Increase (Decrease)
Local cost Foreign Cost
W billion US$ million
1. Construction of New Lines: addition of
five industrial spurs (35 km) 2.4 3.9
2. Increase in Station and Line Capacity: the
first phase of an electrification program
for 350 km of line, expansion of freight
handling facilities, improved operating
facilities in the Seoul area, double tracking
of 97 km of line, and improvements to
marshalling yards 11.1 10.3
3. Way and Structures: replacement of 37-kg/m
rail by 50-kg/m rail, strengthening of
bridges, and provisions for more mechanized
track maintenance equipment 1.4 5.8
4. Motive Power and Rolling Stock: acquisition
of more diesel locomotives (and fewer rail
cars), importation of 236 passenger coaches,
and acquisition of more freight cars (9.4) 4.4
5. Rolling Stock Equipment and Construction:
deferment of Dae Jeon workshops 0.5 0.2
6. Miscellaneous: improvements to telecom-
munications 1.4 2.4
7. Contingencies 0.6 2.8
II. Main Items of the Revised 1967-1971 Plan
(about W 90 billion - see para. 4.02)
1. Construction of New Lines (9% of total expenditure):
- 80 km of single track between Jin Ju and Sun Cheon, begun under
the 1962-1966 program, to improve access from the West of Korea
to the main port of Pu San;
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36 km, in two lines, to serve coal mines
38 km, in two lines, to interconnect developing industrial
areas;
35 km, in five industrial spurs.
Total 189 km
Work has been suspended in 1967 on the construction of five
"inon-program" lines.
2. Increase in Station and Line Caprcity (28% of total expenditure):
first phase of an electrification program for 350 km of single-
track lines connecting Seoul to the northeastern part of Korea,
to serve fast growing cement industry, and construction of a 13-
km connection between two of these lines;
the expansion and remodeling of the present Seoul statiQn as an
exclusive passenger station by removing freight handling, car
inspection and related activities to the Yongsan station which
is to be improved to handle 3 million tons per year; a similar
project in the present Pu San stations; a new freight yard at
Cheong Ryang Ri, east of Seoul, to handle 2 million tons per
year; a new marshalling yard at Je Cheon capable of handling
about 1,400 cars a day and a new freight yard in Yeong Deung
Po, south of Seoul. All the works are necessary to specialize
the terminals and yards and to provide additional handling
capacity in order to meet traffic requirements. At the moment
these facilities are inadequate and reduce the efficiency of
operations. The projected works, in addition to solving present
obstacles, would permit the absorption of the new rolling stock
included in the program whiich otherwise would be deficiently
utilized. The incremental investment in freight handling
facilities is included in the economic justification of addi-
tional freight cars to be financed under the proposed loan!
credit (see Annex 9, para. 1).
- double tracking of part of Seoul-In Cheon and of Dae Jeon-Iri
lines (97 km);
- installation of improved signalling, includes the installation
of CTC in the Seoul area. This is required to increase the
speed, to run more trains per dsv and to improve the qualitv
of the service and the safetv of operations;
- lengthening of crossing loops.
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3. Way and Structure Renewals and Improvements (10% of total ex-
penditure):
- relaying of about 1,000 km of track with 50 kg/rm rail, with
benefits accruing from the use of heavier more powerful diesel
locomotives, longer trains and increased train speeds;
- replacement of wooden ties by concrete ties;
- strengthening of bridges;
- acquisition of mechanical track maintenance equipment to speed
up and improve quality of maintenance.
4. Motive Power and Rollin&Stock (44% of total expenditure):
- procurement of 159 diesel locomotives, 236 passenger coaches,
and 4,585 freight cars;
- local building of 410 passenger coaches and 2,640 freight cars.
5. Ro11inng Stock Maintenance Facilities (1% of total expenditure):
- modernization of sheds and workshops.
6. Miscellaneous (5% of total expenditure):
- installation of a modern telecommunications system;
- improvement to electrical supply equipment;
- employment of consultants;
- training of KNR staff.
III. Freight Stock Requirements in 1971
1. The 1968 freight stock comprised 13,239 cars. With a traffic
of 6,865 million net ton-km, the yearly output per car in stock was
519,000 con-km, and 575,000 ton-km 1/ per car available (availability 90%).
1/ On the basis of the most recent information available in the Bank,
freight car productivity figures expressed in ton-km per serviceable
car for some other railways were as follows: France: 210.000;
Argentina 265.000; Japan 408.000.
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2. KNR's estimates for 1970 are 15,500 cars. With a traffic fore-
cast of 8,486 million net ton-km for that year, the yearly output per car
in stock would be 547,000 ton-km: this productivity figure is satisfactory
and no substantial increase can be expected in the near future.
3. With a 1971 traffic forecast of 9,880 million net ton-km, freight
car requirements can be estimated at about 17,000 units. The following
breakdown of requirements can be made:
1971 Shortage Loan/credit
1968 Stock Requirements 1971 over 1968 items
Miscellaneous
(including box and
other cars) 4,482 7,300 2,800 2,100
Gondola cars 3,966 3,600 - -
Hoppers cars (coal, ore,
ballast) 1,666 2,300 640 300
Tank cars 1,826 1,800 - -
Flat and other cars 1,299 2,000 700 340
13,239 17,000 2,740
Shortage 1971 over 1968 amounts therefore to about 3,800 cars, which would
rise to about 4,250 if cars were scrapped during that period.
4. KNR's proposal included the latter number of cars of which 2,740
are to be financed by the proposed loan/credit.
March 3, 1970
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Proposals for Telecommunication Equipment
There has been extended development of an independent railway
telecommunications network, for both operational and administrative control,
but this has been done with little or no coordination with the Ministry of
Communications (MOC). An examination of KNR's existing facilities showed
that much of the plant is life expired and is in very poor condition.
Operations are being hampered by the many failures and breakdowns occurring,
and the need for improved facilities with greater reliability is obvious.
A program has been outlined, in conjunction with KNR, for modern-
izing and developing the railroad's communications network, which would
form a suitable basis for Bank financing. This program, which is given
below, takes care of the first priority requirements, but must, in certain
details, be regarded as provisional, until consultants' studies and recom-
mendations are available.
Program for Telecommunications Expansion
Estimated Cost
Item US$
1. Microwave and/or coaxial cable systems (with
intersticed pairs) between Seoul-Dae Jeon-Pu
San, equipped for 180 circuits in the first
section and 120 channels in the second section 1,950,000
2. Yong San new 3,000-line automatic exchange and
manual board, and Pu San new 1,000-line automatic
exchange and manual board 650,000
3. Employment of consultants 200,000
4. Contingencies 260,000
Total 3,060,000
In order to finalize the proposals, carry out the detailed
engineering design, and also rationalize future plans for expansion of
KNR's communications network, it is considered essential that KNR should
obtain expert advice through the employment of consultants. Technical
details are given below:
Item 1: The existing overhead route is over 60 years old and, despite
renewals of Doles and arms in certain sections, is not in adequate condition
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to provide reliable communications. The pole renewals which have been ef-
fected have generally been cases of isolated poles which have failed due to
rot. Certain sections have been rebuilt at stations where additional carry-
ing caDacity is necessary. These total no more than 50 of the 450 km.
Serious interference problems exist between Seoul and Dae Jeon and near
Pu San due to parallelism with a high voltage transmission line. With
the exception of the four 12-channel and five low-capacity systems, all
carrier systems in use are outdated US Army Signal Corps equipment which
should be replaced. To provide additional line wires or expand the use
of the present carrier systems would involve very extensive and costly
rebuilding with the provision of additional transposition points. In any
case, the electrification of this section of railway line is ultimately
contemplated, and if this should come about it would make the open wire
communications line unworkable except for circuits over relatively short
sections.
There are a number of possible alternatives for the provision
of a modern wideband system. A microwave system would take care of the
main centers, but the means of providing for intermediate points, possibly
by use of VHF spurs, requires further investigation, particularly in
the light of possible electrification. Cost studies of possible alter-
natives, such as a coaxial cable system with audio pairs, are desirable
before a decision is reached. The facts that MOC is increasing the size
of its microwave svstem and providing a coaxial cable system from Seoul to
Pu San should also be considcred with a view to possible coordination in
the provision and use of facilities; the high cost of guarding microwave
stations against saboteurs, which MOC has found necessary for its stations,
should be taken into account. In the light of these considerations, the
consultant should recommend on the system to be adopted and should prepare
the final design.
Item 2: The present Yong San exchange has a capacity of 2,000 lines.
The initial 500 lines of Strowger equipment which would normally be ex-
pected to have a life of from 20-25 years were installed in 1937, are worn
out, and in very bad condition. Extensions of 600 lines provided in 1952,
and 400 lines provided in 1954 are in only fair condition and must be con-
sidered as nearing the end of their useful life; only the extension of
500 lines provided in 1962 is in reasonably good condition. The accommoda-
tion is not adequate and serious dust conditions exist despite every pre-
caution taken by the communications section. Replacement of this exchange
in adequate accommodation at the most suitable location as related to
pending moves of offices is a matter of urgent necessity. Some equipment,
particularly the last extension, could usefully be reused for re-instal-
lation elsewhere, possiblv to extend Dae Jeon. The 14-position manual
board dates from 1933, is also worn out, and needs replacement in new
accommodation.
The 600-line Pentaconta exchange at Pu San was installed only in
1959 and is in good condition. The regional bureau and certain of the
operations sections are scheduled to move in 1970 to the new South Station
some three miles away. Cost of a new 1,000-line exchange, including manual
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board, is estimated at US$250,000 (US$200,000 foreign exchange); cost of ex-
tending all circuits to the present exchange after the move has not been
calculated but might amount to US$100,000. The existing exchange accommoda-
tion is inadequate, but limited expansion is possible. There are obvious
administrative advantages in moving the exchange. A tentative provision
for financing has been made subject to theoretical and practical center
studies and a recommendation by the consultant.
Traffic Justification
Traffic Records:
1. Telegraphs
Year Messages % Increase
1965 7.2 million
1966 9.8 million + 36
1967 10.4 million + 6.1
1968 10.0 million - 3.8
Average increase: + 12% per annum.
2. Telephones
Records on Subscriber Trunk Dial (STD) calls are not maintained, so
useful figures are not available.
3. Passenger Traffic
Average increase in total passenger-kcm over 8-year period, 1959-1967,
is 10.1% per annum.
4. Freight Traffic
Average increase in total ton-km over 8-year period, 1959-1967, is
9.2% per annum.
Main line route, Seoul-Pu San, circuit requirements:
Existing Route Capacity
Physical Dairs Phantoms Carrier Total
Yong San-Dae Jeon 16 4 52 72
Dae Jeon-Dae Gu 14 3 43 60
Dae Cu-Pu San 16 3 37 56
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Some overloading exists on the main telephone routes with delays up
to two hours in obtaining connections. KNR estimates that an additional
20-30 circuits are required on each section to reduce delays to reasonable
proportions and allow STD to operate, i.e. present circuit requirements
Yong San-Dae Jeon: say 100; and Dae Jeon-Pu San, 80. If traffic is grow-
ing at 10% p.a., requirements by the time of commissioning of new system
(3 years) will be: Seoul-Dae Jeon, 133; Dae Jeon-Pu San, 106. To allow
for further growth, it is proposed to initially equip for 180 and 120
channels, respectively.
October 15, 1969
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Draft Terms of Reference for Communications Consultants
The consultants will be employed to examine and report on the
following points:
Phase I
(i) The justification for a separate KNR wideband system be-
tween Seoul and Pusan or, alternatively, use of shared facilities with MOC
on a rented or joint project basis. If a separate system is considered
justified, recommend on whether microwave or coaxial cable facilities
should be provided in the light of present value cost studies and the
individual advantages offered by each system. If joint usage is supported,
a recommendation on a basis for such joint usage equitable to both the
parties concerned should be made; i.e. rental, joint ownership, etc.;
proposed arrangements for maintenance and operation should be outlined.
Anv operational disadvantages to either KNR or MOC in the use of joint
facilities should be outlined.
(ii) A theoretical/practical center study for locating the new
exchange at Yong San.
(iii) The justification for a new exchange at the new Regional
Bureau/South Station, Pusan, based on theoretical/practical center studies
and possible use of the existing exchange elsewhere.
Phase II
(i) The adequacy of the existing communications network and
the need for the additional and improved facilities as related to the ex-
pansion and growth of the rail system.
(ii) The adequacy of the present communications sections organi-
zation, personnel training needs, and other possible measures to improve
efficiency.
(iii) The arrangments to be adopted for the most efficient and
coordinated use of the communications network by all departments and func-
tions of KNR.
(iv) The degree of future integration with the MOC network which
mav be desirable, and how far this may be of advantage or otherwise in in-
creasing reliability and reducing the cost of provision of facilities re-
quired by KNR.
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(v) The proDosed overall development plan in the light of the
above considerations; the establishment of proper priorities and a time
schedule for the development of the communications network related to the
state of the existing plant and the need for replacement in order to ensure
reliability; the establishment of a program for other replacements not
covered in the development program; a review of life histories and depre-
ciation provisions.
(vi) A broad initial review of the pattern of development taking
into account the problems likely to arise in connection with electrifica-
tion.
(vii) The detailed plan for automatization of the KNR telephone
network and the extension of long-distance dialing facilities; the use of
imported crossbar telephone switching instead of locally produced step-by-
step equipment.
(viii) The proposed extension of the VHF communications network.
October 15, 1969
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Coal Transport Study
1. A comprehensive survey on coal transportation and distribution
was made in 1967/1968 by consultants (SOFRERAIL-SOFREMINES, France) fi-
nanced under Credit 110-KO at a cost of US$25,000 equivalent. The con-
sultants' final report was published in August 1968.
2. Efficient coal transportation in Korea is presently prevented
by the extreme dispersion of coal shipping and receiving stations, and
by the inefficient organization of coal mines and briquet manufacturers.
3. In the field of railroad transportation, the main difficulties
arise from (a) a lack of adequate loading and unloading facilities (which
ought to be provided by the mines and briquet manufacturers), preventing
KNR from taking advantage of modern equipment such as coal hopper cars
and resulting in unsatisfactory car turn-around time (4.9 days); (b) the
method of shipment in single cars instead of complete train sets - result-
ing in high transportation costs due to heavy switching operations and
long standing time in shipping and receiving stations; (c) the present rate
structure, giving no incentive to transportation by complete train sets.
4. The consultants' report puts forward many useful and practical
suggestions for solving or easing these problems. In many cases, the
carrying out of the consultants' recommendations would result in consider-
able financial benefits. Thus, in the case of KNR, implementation of rec-
ommendations made regarding loading, sampling, grouping and unloading
to 20% of the coal traffic now carried on KNR would save 330 cars or about
10% of the total fleet required for shipment of coal. There would also be
other savings in yard construction and railroad daily operations.
5. Because of the nature of many of the problems (e.g. the closure
of small mines) and because of the interdependence of all parties con-
cerned 1/ with the problems of coal traffic, the consultants recommended
establishing a coordinating body with authority to deal with the recom-
mendations of their report and the carrying out of further studies if
necessary.
6. Little or no implementation of the consultants' recommendations
has yet taken place. Coordination should be the responsibility of the
Government and the chief coordinator should be a senior Government official
of the EPB which appears to be the department most suited to deal with
this matter.
1/ Coal mines, briquet manufacturers, City of Seoul, KNR, Government
agencies.
October 15, 1969
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Items to be Financed by the Proposed Loan/Credit
1. Fifty 2500-3000 hp diesel locomotives required to handle the in-
creasing traffic until electrification of the heavy loaded coal and cement
lines is completed, and then to help in the phasing out of steam. They
will also be useful for emergency operations on the electrified lines in
case of power failures, and for handling high speed passenger traffic on
the Seoul-Pu San line.
2. Some 2,740 freight cars, of 50- to 70-ton carrying capacity, con-
sisting of 140 flatcars (of which 40 are for container operations), 200
ore-hopper cars, 200 bulk cement cars, 100 ballast hopper cars, and 2,100
general purpose cars (including box cars, gondolas, flat cars). All these
cars are urgently required to deal with forecast increases in specific
traffics, based on production and consumption projections, or to relieve
current capacity deficiencies.
3. Telecommunication equipment, dealt with in detail in Annex 5.
The actual equipment to be procured will depend on the result of consul-
tant's studies.
4. Track maintenance equipment consisting of: (i) a track inspection
car performing a geometrical check of the track under loan, for the guidance
of management in planning and for overall safety of operations. This car
will enable KNR to carry out two checks a year on trunk lines and one check
a year on all other lines; (ii) equipment for double and single-track oper-
ations (4 multiple tie tampers, 3 ballast regulators, 3 ballast compactors,
1 ballast cleaner); (iii) various machines to soeed up work (80 power
wrenches, 174 band-held tampers, 72 four-headed tie tampers, 30 rail drills,
33 gang motor cars and 51 trailers) and (iv) 5 portable rail-crack detect-
ing devices.
5. The services of consultants: (a) to examine KNR'S telecommunica-
tion requirements in coordination with the Ministry of Communications' plans;
and (b) to study the problem of diesel motive power maintenance, to review
the position of workshops, and to assist KNR in evaluating the bids for
procurement of the above mentioned diesel locomotives and track maintenance
equipment.
February 24, 1970
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Economic Benefits and Methodology
Freight Cars
1. The traffic forecast for the period 1970-72 cannot be trans-
ported by rail unless new freight cars are urgently acquired. Because
of freight car shortages, KNR has consistently rationed their availabil-
ity to shippers, resulting in the loss of large volumes of traffic. The
proposed loan/credit would finance 2,100 general purpose, 200 ore hopper
cars, 200 bulk cement cars and 140 flat cars, 40 of which are for con-
tainers for general cargo and 100 for the hauling of timber, construction
material, etc. Also included are 100 ballast hopper cars whose justifica-
tion is provided in item 4 below. The freight cars included have a total
cost of US$28.4 million and are of 50-70 ton carrying capacity, while pres-
ent cars average 35 tons. If these new cars were not purchased, the
result would be a diversion to coastal shipping of most of the additional
traffic at substantially higher costs. The hauling of coal and cement
from the Northeast area to the Seoul area, for instance, involves a dis-
tance of 950 km by ship between the ports of Mug Ho and In Cheon plus the
land movement from the mines and plants to Mug Ho and from In Cheon to
Seoul as compared with a direct haul of about 310 km by rail. For this
traffic the total transport cost is estimated at Won 1,060 per ton by
rail and Won 2,050 per ton by ship. Analysis suggests that rail cost, as
compared with coastal shipping haulage costs, results in net savings of Won
5.5 billion per year. These benefits do not increase as the cars will be
fully utilized immediately after they are put into service. All of the
incremental railroad costs in order to haul the freight cars are included
in the economic justification; i.e. ground facilities of electrification,
motive power and handling facilities. The freight cars are well justified
with an economic rate of return of 26% over their useful lives.
Diesel Locomotives
2. The 50 diesel locomotives to be purchased under the project with
a total cost of US$19.5 million (including US$2 million for spares) are
required to enable KNR to handle the increase of traffic expected during
the 1969-1971 period. The purchase of powerful diesels (2,500-3,000 hp)
would make it possible to cope with the difficult grades frequently en-
countered on the KNR system and increase the size and speed of trains,
thus expanding KNR's carrying capacity. After electrification of the
north-east lines is completed in 1973, the diesel locomotives provided
under this project would permit the redistribution of existing smaller
diesel units to shunting duties, thus replacing the last remaining steam
locomotives. Economic benefits are represented by the savings in total
transport costs as a result of carrying additional traffic by rail, avoid-
ing its diversion to coastal shipping, during the period 1970-1973. With
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the same methodology applied to freight cars in item 1, the rate of return
on the investment would be 25%. After 1973 and throughout the useful life
of the new locomotives, the benefits will arise from savings in main-
tenance and operating costs of the replaced steam locomotives amounting
to a total of W 927 million per year. The rate of return would be 15Z.
The average rate of return would be about 16%.
Telecommunication Equipment
3. An adequate, efficient and reliable communication system is
essential for KNR's operations and management. The equipment to be se-
cured under the project, costing a total of US$2.6 million, will replace
obsolete and deteriorated installations, some of which are over 60 years
old. The present old equipment requires expensive maintenance, and in-
terruptions of service due to failure are frequent. The microwfave or co-
axial system to be provided would replace the present open wire lines
along the trunk route to Pu San and would provide additional capacity to
meet the increased demand of communications associated with the traffic
growth. The economic benefits of the new equipment as compared with the
present equipment are represented by savings in operation and maintenance,
amounting to US$285,000 per year. As compared with the investment and oper-
ating cost of replacing and expanding the present system, the additional
investment in proposed equipment yields a rate of return of 17%. A dif-
ferent approach to the economic justification of the microwave/coaxial
system, assuming KNR used long-distance public telecommunications ervices
instead of its own equipment, shows that annual costs of KNR would amount
to about US$700,000 per year as compared with the cost of the same service
with own equipment. This represents a rate of return above 23.4%.
Track Maintenance Equipment
4. To adequately maintain KNR's way, modernization of present main-
tenance operations is required. The project would provide equipment at a
total cost of US$3.4 million (including 100 ballast cars) that will allow
a substantial reduction of the labor force in the maintenance gangs and
will perform a better quality work on the track. At the moment 4,350 workers
are employed on maintenance, representing a ratio of .8 man per track/km.
This is a very low ratio (Japan 2.1, Italy 1.56, France 1.03) and KNR is
going to increase it to 1.3 over a five-year period by employing almost
7,000 men if the equipment is not purchased. With the new equipment,
annual savings in labor cost would increase from Won 120,000 to lion 2.4
m4llion over the useful life period of 9 years. The investment on the
equipment yields a rate of return of 32%.
March 3, 1970
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Tariff Structure
1. Freight Rates
Until May 19, 1969, there were three classes for carload freight
(accounting for over 90% of all freight) as follows:
Class 1 - W 121.30 per ton for each 50 km - W 2.42 per ton-km
Class 2 - W 80.75 per ton for each 50 km - W 1.62 per ton-km
Class 3 - W 57.65 per ton for each 50 km - W 1.16 per ton-km
There is no taper for long distances.
There are also three classes for less-than-carload traffic, the rates
per 100 kg for each 50 km being:
Class 1 - W 28.85 - W 5.77 per ton-km
Class 2 - W 23.55 - W 4.71 per ton-km
Class 3 - W 21.40 - W 4.28 per ton-km
On May 20, 1969, the three carload classes were expanded to five,
the existing classes 2 and 3 becoming new classes 3 and 5, together
with a new class 2 (W 98.00 per ton/50 km or W 1.96 per ton-km) and
a new class 4 (W 66.30 per ton/50 km or W 1.33 per ton-km).
The main changes were: cattle and gasoline moved from class 2
to class 1; ores, fertilizer, bricks, timber, salt and grains moved
from old class 3 to new class 4; and cement and fruit and vegetables
moved from old class 3 to new class 3.
Coal remains in the lowest class (new class 5) but the minimum
charge is W 3.460 per 30-ton car which is equivalent to a minimum
distance of 100 km for a fully loaded car. Thus, the average revenue
earned per ton-km by coal is about W 1.40 as against the class 5
nominal figure of W 1.16.
The main items in each class now are:
Class 1: Gasoline, Cattle, Textiles, Clothing, Furniture, Meat
and Dangerous Goods (the latter plus 10%);
Class 2: Sugar, Cotton, Plywood, Hardboard;
Class 3: Cement, Diesel and Bunker Oils, Fruit and Vegetables;
Class 4: Lumber, Rice, Grains, Salt, Fertilizer, Limestone,
Ores, Bricks, Pulp, Asphalt;
Class 5: Coal.
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2. Passenger Fares
There are three classes of passenger fares averaging W 3.66,
W 2.44 and W 1.22 per pass-km. In addition, there are surcharges
for travel on various express trains and for sleeper berths. In
addition to these fares is a "traffic tax" of 10%, reimbursable by
KNR to Government.
Substantial reductions, imposed by Government, are granted to
teachers and students (30%), armed forces and police (50%) and to
student commuters (70%), but traffic in these categories is not
significant.
October 15, 1969
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